United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division
BRYAN HARWELL, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Arnold Parson Jr., proceeding pro se, filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, among other
claims, that he was handcuffed in an excessively tight
manner. The matter is now before the Court for consideration
of Defendants' objections to the Report and
Recommendation (“R & R”) of United States
Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West, who recommends denying
their motion for summary judgment.
Review of the R & R
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.
The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive
weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination
remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review
of those portions of the R & R to which specific
objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the
Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been
filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de
novo review when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a
specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v.
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews
only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the
Court need not give any explanation for adopting the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., Md.,
789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015); see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”). “A party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record
. . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or
that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The facts and
inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 413, but the Court
“cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of
the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015).
“the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “A dispute of
material fact is ‘genuine' if sufficient evidence
favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to
return a verdict for that party.” Seastrunk v.
United States, 25 F.Supp.3d 812, 814 (D.S.C. 2014). A
fact is “material” if proof of its existence or
nonexistence would affect disposition of the case under the
applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
summary judgment stage, “the moving party must
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Once the moving party has met his burden, the nonmoving party
must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere
allegations contained in the pleadings to show that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of
Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal
citation omitted). Summary judgment is not warranted unless,
“from the totality of the evidence, including
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
affidavits, the [C]ourt believes no genuine issue of material
fact exists for trial and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Whiteman v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 385 (4th
Cir. 2013); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
filed this § 1983 action alleging his constitutional
rights were violated when Marion County law enforcement
executed a state-court writ of assistance and forcibly
removed him from foreclosed property by arresting him.
Plaintiff's sole remaining claim is his § 1983
excessive force claim relating to his allegedly excessively
tight handcuffing during his arrest; this claim is pending
against the fourteen above-captioned Defendants in their
individual capacities. See ECF No. 161 (verified third
evidence shows Defendants-who are agents/employees of the
Marion County Sheriff's Department-went to
Plaintiff's residence in Mullins, South Carolina, on the
morning of November 2, 2015, to execute the writ of
assistance and eject him from the premises. The parties have
provided video footage from the scene (recorded by patrol
vehicle and body cameras). See ECF Nos. 50, 78, 104,
213, & 219.
videos depict multiple police vehicles arriving at a mobile
home and surrounding it. Armed officers approach the front of
the house, and one officer knocks on the front door.
Plaintiff can be heard inside asking, “Who is
it?”; the officer replies, “Sheriff's Office,
” and tells him to open the door; and Plaintiff says he
is putting on clothes. Plaintiff then exits the front door
with both arms raised and stands on the porch while holding a
cell phone in one hand and a cigarette in another. He is
barefoot and dressed in a T-shirt and shorts. Plaintiff
states, “I don't know what's going on, ”
and after an officer informs him he is being evicted from the
premises, Plaintiff says that there is an appeal on file and
that he has sent notices to everyone. Defendant Darren
Miles approaches and informs Plaintiff,
“You have this instance only to leave this residence on
your own free will or you will be arrested.” Plaintiff
states he will leave if he can get his clothes, and after not
being allowed to do so, Plaintiff says, “Well, then,
you do have to arrest me, ” and walks down the stairs.
Defendant Miles then says, “Arrest him.”
Defendant Jack McCaskill immediately handcuffs Plaintiff behind
his back, and Plaintiff is placed in the back seat of a
patrol vehicle. Before being put into the vehicle, Plaintiff
says, “Hey, you're violating my rights going in
that home, ” repeatedly yells, “Breach of the
peace” and “Help, ” and states,
“I'm in fear for my life.”
three minutes later, Defendants Jack McCaskill and Jonathan
Edwards remove Plaintiff from the vehicle, place him in the
back seat of another patrol vehicle, and secure the seatbelt.
Plaintiff is then transported to jail by Defendants Edwards
and Dale Sylvester.
the ride to jail, which lasts approximately fifteen minutes,
Plaintiff is still handcuffed with his hands behind his back.
Soon after being placed in the back seat, he moves his left
hand to his left hip while his right hand remains behind his
back. He frequently moves around on the seat by leaning
forward and adjusting his arms, opens and closes his left
hand, bows his head and shakes several times, and makes the
• “Sir, I can't feel the circulation in my
hands. I'm a diabetic with high blood pressure, sir.
Losing circulation in my hands. My hands feel numb.”
• “Sir, I'm a diabetic with high blood
pressure. This thing is cutting off my circulation. And
I've been diagnosed with COPD.”
says, “Sir, ” several other times. Neither
Defendant Edwards nor Defendant Sylvester responds to
Plaintiff's statements, and he ...