United States District Court, D. South Carolina
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Charles Barkley, Jr. (“Petitioner”), proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the calculation of his
sentence and seeking habeas corpus relief. Pursuant to the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ.
Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized
to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and
recommendations to the district judge. For the following
reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge
dismiss the petition without prejudice and without requiring
Respondent to file a return.
Factual and Procedural Background
is a federal inmate incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Williamsburg, South Carolina. [ECF No. 1 at
1]. On October 4, 2002, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina (“Western District of North
Carolina”) to three separate counts of bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). USA v.
John Charles Barkley, Jr., No. 3:02-CR-195-MOC, ECF No.
31 at 2 (W.D. N.C. Jun. 10, 2009). On July 23, 2003, United
States District Judge Lacy H. Thornburg (“Judge
Thornburg”), sentenced Petitioner to a term of
imprisonment of 166 months for each of the three counts to
run concurrently, a three-year term of supervised release,
and a special assessment of $300. Petitioner appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(“Fourth Circuit”), which affirmed his conviction
and sentence. Id. at 5-6.
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Petitioner subsequently filed a
petition for habeas corpus relief in the Western District of
North Carolina. Id. at 6. Judge Thornburg denied
Petitioner's § 2255 petition on June 10, 2009.
Id. at 23.
completed his custodial sentence and commenced supervised
release on October 10, 2014. Id. at ECF No. 32. On
December 18, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge David S.
Cayer (“Judge Cayer”), ordered Petitioner be
detained pending appearance for a final supervised release
violation hearing. Id. at ECF No. 37. On February 2,
2016, United States District Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr.
(“Judge Cogburn”), committed Petitioner to the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) for a
term of four months and a term of supervised release of two
years for violations of the terms of supervised release.
Id. at ECF No. 53. On December 19, 2016, Judge Cayer
again ordered Petitioner be detained pending appearance
before Judge Cogburn for a final supervised release violation
hearing. Id. at ECF No. 49. Petitioner pleaded
guilty to supervised release violations on February 17, 2017,
and Judge Cogburn sentenced him to the custody of the BOP for
a term of eight months and a term of supervised release of
one year. Id. at ECF No. 54.
over Petitioner's supervised release was transferred to
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina (“Middle District of North
Carolina”) on January 31, 2018. USA v. John Charles
Barkley, Jr., No. 1:18-CR-35-WO-1 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 31,
2018). On April 24, 2018, Petitioner appeared before United
States Magistrate Judge L. Patrick Auld (“Judge
Auld”), for an initial appearance and detention
hearing. Id. at ECF No. 16. Judge Auld ordered
Petitioner be held in custody pending a final revocation
hearing. Id. On July 17, 2018, Petitioner appeared
before United States District Judge William L. Osteen, Jr.
(“Judge Osteen”). Id. at ECF No. 22.
Judge Osteen revoked Petitioner's supervised release and
committed him to the BOP for a period of 24 months.
alleges the BOP is denying him good time credit under Section
102(b)(1) of the First Step Act. [ECF No. 1 at 2]. He
requests the court order the BOP to award him 112 days of
good time credit and immediately release him from
custody. Id. at 8.
Standard of Review
established local procedure in this judicial district, this
petition has been carefully reviewed pursuant to the Rules
Governing Section 2244 Proceedings for the United States
District Court, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se
complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with
liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant
to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In
evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's
allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of
N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated
liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means if
the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid
claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so.
Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does
not mean the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading
to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable
in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over the Matter
is well established that defendants convicted in federal
court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their
convictions and sentences through § 2255.”
Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010)
(citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir.
1997)). Challenges to the execution of a ...