United States District Court, D. South Carolina
F. ANDERSON, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Gilmore, (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro
se, is incarcerated by the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) at the United States Penitentiary
(“USP”) Canaan in Waymart, Pennsylvania.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 alleging the Family
Court of Richland County (“Family Court”),
Richland County Sheriff's Department
(“Sheriff's Department”), and Department of
Social Services for Richland County, Child Support Services
(“DSS”) (collectively “Respondents”)
failed to provide a sufficiently detailed statement notifying
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that he is not
subject to a detainer upon release from BOP custody. (ECF No.
1). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.),
this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for initial
Magistrate Judge assigned to this action prepared a
thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”) and
opines that this court should dismiss the petition with
prejudice and without issuance and service of process because
this action is duplicative of a prior action dismissed with
prejudice. (ECF No. 6). The Report sets forth, in detail, the
relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this
court incorporates those facts and standards without a
recitation. Briefly, Petitioner alleges Respondents failed to
provide sufficient detail in a status report to the BOP,
resulting in a detainer that will prevent him from being
released into the community on his release date. These same
arguments were asserted in the prior action of Gilmore v.
Family Court of Richland County, C/A No. 1:18-2676-JFA,
2019 WL 3852505 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2019).
was advised of his right to object to the Report, which was
entered on the docket on September 29, 2019. (ECF No. 6).
Petitioner filed objections to the Report on October 7, 2019.
(ECF No. 8). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
court is charged with making a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report to which specific objections
are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge,
or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
However, a district court is only required to conduct a
de novo review of the specific portions of the
Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b);
Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific
objections to portions of the Report of the Magistrate, this
court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the
recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,
199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the court must only review those
portions of the Report to which Petitioner has made a
specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life
& Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).
objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge
to focus attention on those issues-factual and legal-that are
at the heart of the parties' dispute.'”
Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No.
0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec.
12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121
E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A
specific objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report thus
requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the
complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See
Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL
4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection
must “direct the court to a specific error in the
magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would
a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No.
9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007)
(citing Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court
reviews portions “not objected to-including those
portions to which only ‘general and conclusory'
objections have been made-for clear error.”
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Diamond, 416
F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200;
Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47).
enumerated five separate “objections” in response
to the Report. (ECF No. 8). Objection number one takes issue
with the Report's introduction which states Petitioner
filed a claim under 28 U.S.C § 2441, when in reality he
filed a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241. A review of
the Petition indicates that Petitioner did indeed request
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1).
However, the Report's single reference to § 2441
appears to be a typographical error only and therefore there
is no error in the substantive analysis of the Report.
second objection takes issue with the introduction of the
Report wherein the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal of
the petition. Petitioner states that “I mades claims
for my relief” and “I request my petition be
serve on the family court.” (ECF No. 8 p. 1) (written
as it appears in the original). This objection fails to point
to any error in the Report and is merely a conclusory
assertion disagreeing with the Report. Accordingly, this is
not a specific objection which would warrant a de
third objection appears to take issue with the Magistrate
Judge's recitation of Petitioner's asserted grounds
for relief. Despite this conclusory allegation, the
Magistrate Judge correctly stated that the crux of
Petitioner's request is that the Family Court failed to
provide sufficient detail in a status report to the BOP.
Accordingly, this objection also fails to show any error in
fourth objection again merely expresses his dissatisfaction
with the Report's conclusion by stating the Magistrate
Judge made an error “to dismiss my case that action
fails to state claim on which relief may be granted.”
(ECF No. 8 p. 2) (written as it appears in the original).
Here again, this “objection” ...