United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Spartanburg Division
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT
ISSUANCE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
GEIGER LEWIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Cale Marcus Strickland (Strickland) filed this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter is before the Court for
review of the Report and Recommendation (Report) of the
United States Magistrate Judge suggesting Strickland's
action be dismissed with prejudice and without issuance and
service of process. The Report was made in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636 and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District
of South Carolina.
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The
responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976).
The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of
those portions of the Report to which specific objection is
made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or
recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
Magistrate Judge filed the Report on March 6, 2019. Although
Strickland's objections to the Report were due no later
than March 20, 2019, he failed to file any document titled
on March 16, 2019, the Clerk of Court entered
Strickland's “Petition for Permission to
Appeal.” But, the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction is
limited to consider only final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C.
1292. Neither the Magistrate Judge's February 14, 2019,
Order nor the Report fit into any of these three categories.
the Court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings,
Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978), holding them to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980), and because Strickland's “Petition for
Permission to Appeal” was filed within the time-frame
that objections were to be filed, the Court has no choice
other than to construe Strickland's “Petition for
Permission to Appeal” as his objections to the Report,
see, e.g., Hester v. N.C. Atty. Gen., 199 F.3d 1327
(4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (interpreting a
“Notice of Appeal” as “Objections to the
Report” when the petitioner filed a notice of appeal
instead of objections to the Report during the time period
for filing objections to the Report).
Court need not conduct a de novo review of the record
“when a party makes general and conclusory objections
that do not direct the court to a specific error in the
[Magistrate Judge's] proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Howard v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508-09 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding general objections are insufficient to
preserve appellate review). In this case, Strickland made the
most general of objections by merely stating his desire to
was warned of the consequences of failing to file specific
objections. Report 14. In that Strickland neglected to
specify the portions of the Report to which he objected, this
Court holds he has waived appellate review.
thorough de novo review of the Report and the record in this
case, the Court overrules Strickland's objections, adopts
the Report, and incorporates it herein. Therefore, it is the
judgment of the Court that Strickland's action is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IS SO ORDERED.
OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
parties are hereby notified of the right to appeal this Order
within thirty days from the date hereof, pursuant to ...