United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division
Bryan Harwell Chief United States District Judge
matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff
Leroy Shaw's objections to the Report and Recommendation
(“R & R”) of United States Magistrate Judge
Bristow Marchant, who recommends summarily dismissing
Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. See ECF
Nos. 11 & 15.
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.
The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive
weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination
remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review
of those portions of the R & R to which specific
objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the
Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been
filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de
novo review when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a
specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v.
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews
only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the
Court need not give any explanation for adopting the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed his complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional
rights were violated in connection with a disciplinary
hearing at Perry Correctional Institution on February 7,
2019, which resulted in several disciplinary
sanctions. See ECF Nos. 1 & 1-1. The
Magistrate Judge recommends summarily dismissing this action
because (1) Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim,
(2) Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in
their official capacities, and (3) supplemental jurisdiction
is not warranted for Plaintiff's state-law claims.
See R & R at pp. 3-10.
objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that he has
not alleged a deprivation of a protected liberty interest.
See ECF No. 15. “[T]o show the deprivation of
a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, an
inmate must show either: (1) the conditions exceed the
sentence imposed in such an unexpected manner as to give rise
to protection by the Due Process Clause or (2) the
confinement creates an atypical or significant hardship in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.” McNeill v. Currie, 84 Fed.Appx.
276, 277 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)). Plaintiff has not made either
showing because the disciplinary sanctions imposed-thirty
days of disciplinary detention, six additional months in
solitary confinement (during which time he had to travel to
the shower in restraints) and loss of canteen, visitation,
and phone privileges for 120 days-did not (1) unexpectedly
exceed his sentence (life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole) or (2) create an atypical or
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485
(“Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide
range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of
the sentence imposed by a court of law.”); Dilworth
v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining
“disciplinary segregation, [as] held in
Sandin, does not rise to th[e] level” of
“‘atypical and significant hardship' on
prisoners”); see, e.g., Sandin, 515
U.S. at 483-84 (finding no due process violation where a
misconduct hearing resulted in “30 days'
disciplinary segregation” for a prisoner “serving
an indeterminate term of 30 years to life”);
Beverati, 120 F.3d at 503-04 (finding no due process
violation where inmates were confined in administrative
segregation for six months and faced “onerous”
conditions there). In sum, Plaintiff has not plausibly
alleged deprivation of a protected liberty
also asks for an opportunity to amend his complaint,
see ECF No. 15 at p. 2, and has filed a separate
motion seeking leave to amend. See ECF No. 15.
However, Plaintiff has neither filed a proposed amended
complaint nor explained how he could cure the deficiencies
identified by the Magistrate Judge. Moreover, given the
disciplinary sanctions alleged by Plaintiff, the Court
concludes amendment would be futile and will therefore deny
his motion to amend. See ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of
Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 217 (4th Cir. 2019)
(recognizing a court may deny a motion to amend if
“amendment would be futile”).
foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES
Plaintiff's objections, ADOPTS the R
& R [ECF No. 11], DENIES Plaintiff's
motion to amend [ECF No. 16], and DISMISSES
his complaint without prejudice and without issuance
and service of process. IT IS SO ORDERED.
 The Magistrate Judge issued the R
& R in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local
Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). The Court is mindful of its
duty to liberally construe Plaintiff's pro se filings.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(recognizing “[a] document filed pro se is to
be liberally construed” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But see United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d
789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although courts must
liberally construe the claims of pro se litigants,
the special judicial solicitude with which a district court
should view ...