United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Rock Hill Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
GEIGER LEWIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is Defendant Cravelyn Squilla Davis's
(Davis) motion to reconsider the order denying his prior
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and/or plea agreement.
Davis is represented by excellent counsel. Having carefully
considered the motion, the response, the record, and the
applicable law, it is the judgment of the Court Davis's
motion for reconsideration will be denied.
government filed a two-count indictment against Davis
charging him with: 1) violations of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) (collectively Drug Charges); and
2) violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i),
1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). Davis entered into a
plea agreement with the government agreeing to plead guilty
to the Drug Charges. The Court held a Rule 11 hearing with a
complete guilty plea colloquy (Rule 11 Colloquy). The Court
has not entered final judgment as of the date of this order.
receiving the Pre-Sentence Report in late June 2019, Davis
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and/or plea
agreement (original motion). The Court denied that motion on
September 17, 2019. Davis filed this motion asking the Court
to reconsider that order on September 19, 2019, and the
government filed a response.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
some circuits broadly allow for motions for reconsideration
in criminal cases, see United States v. Randall, 666
F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Although the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not authorize a motion for
reconsideration, motions to reconsider in criminal
prosecutions are proper.”) (internal quotes omitted),
the Fourth Circuit has limited the propriety of trial court
jurisdiction over motions to reconsider in criminal cases to
before the entry of judgment. United States v.
Breit, 754 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1985).
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure lack any guidance on
motions for reconsideration, the Court will look to the rules
governing civil cases as a guidepost. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) permits a motion to alter or amend a judgment
within twenty-eight days of entry of that judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Although the Court, as noted, has not
entered judgment, the law interpreting Rule 59(e) is
Rule 59(e), the Fourth Circuit has found three grounds for
amending an earlier judgment: “(1) to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new
evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear
error of law.” Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d
1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). To prevail on a motion for
reconsideration based on new evidence, the movant must
demonstrate not only the “evidence was newly discovered
or unknown to it until after the [motion], ” but also
that the party “could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced such evidence” in the
original motion. Boryan v. United States, 884 F.2d
767, 771 (4th Cir. 1989).
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Davis filed the motion for reconsideration within the
twenty-eight-day period prescribed by Rule 59(e).
presents no intervening change in controlling law nor any
argument of clear error in the Court's ruling on his
original motion. Instead, Davis presents a list of ten
alleged ways he was “misled by the Government.”
Davis has failed to show any of the purported misdeeds by the
government were “newly discovered or unknown to [him]
until after” he filed his original motion. Id.
Further, he presents the allegations without any proof and
many dispute factual allegations Davis previously agreed to
during his Rule 11 Colloquy. See Plea Tr. at 39
(“THE COURT: . . . Sir, you understand when you plead
guilty, you admit the truth of this charge against you?
DEFENDANT DAVIS: Yes, ma'am.”). None of the issues