United States District Court, D. South Carolina
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
petitioner, Wilfred Farrior, Jr., a self-represented federal
prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter is before the
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil
Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Petition in
accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it
should be summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Factual and Procedural Background
an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Estill,
South Carolina, indicates that in 2015, he pled guilty in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina to conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 2.) Petitioner pled
guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement in which ten
other counts in the indictment were dismissed. (ECF No. 1-1
at 2, 4.) He was sentenced to 150 months' imprisonment in
2016 with three years of supervised release. (Id. at
did not file a direct appeal, but he later filed a motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, alleging, among other things, that plea
counsel was ineffective for advising Petitioner to plead
guilty to the conspiracy charge when he was “actually
innocent” of that offense. (Id. at 6.) The
§ 2255 motion was dismissed by the Eastern District of
North Carolina in 2018. (Id.)
now brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that he is “actually
innocent” of the conspiracy charge because the factual
basis of the plea showed that Petitioner conspired with
government informants, and legally, conspiracy with
government agents will not support a conspiracy charge.
(Id. at 18-24.) He argues that because he did not
know that he was actually innocent at the time of his guilty
plea and only recently learned of this “evidence,
” the court should find that § 2255 was inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
(Id. at 10.)
Standard of Review
established local procedure in this judicial district, a
careful review has been made of the pro se petition
filed in this case pursuant to the Rules Governing §
2254 Cases,  28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214;
and in light of the following precedents: Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md.
House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc);
Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
court is required to liberally construe pro se
pleadings, which are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d
206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of
liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore
a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set
forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil
petitioner cannot challenge his federal conviction and
sentence through § 2241 unless he can show under the
“savings clause” of § 2255(e) that a §
2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.” See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e); see also United States v. Wheeler,
886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that the failure
to meet the requirements of the savings clause is a
jurisdictional defect that may not be waived).
the court notes that Petitioner raises this issue as a claim
of “actual innocence, ” see
generally Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995);
but Petitioner does not base his claim on new
evidence. Rather, Petitioner's claim is that he
is newly aware that the facts underlying his conviction are
not legally sufficient to support the offense to which he
pled guilty. In other words, Petitioner's claim is that
his guilty plea was not entered with the full knowledge of
the law. This claim was considered and rejected by the
Eastern District of North Carolina in its order denying
Petitioner's § 2255 motion. Farrior v. Untied
States, No. 7:17-CV-5-FL (Docket Entries 59 & 62).
Consequently, § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of Petitioner's conviction. See In
re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered
inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has
been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because
an individual is procedurally barred from filing a §
2255 motion.”) (internal citations omitted).
this case should be dismissed because this court lacks
jurisdiction over the Petition. ...