United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Anderson/Greenwood Division
OPINION AND ORDER
Howe Hendricks United States District Judge
matter is before the Court for review of the Report and
Recommendation entered by United States Magistrate Judge
Jacquelyn D. Austin on March 25, 2019 (“Report”).
(ECF No. 36.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02 for the District of South
Carolina, this case was referred to Magistrate Judge Austin
to review Petitioner Darryl Frierson’s
(“Petitioner”) 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for
habeas relief, to handle pretrial matters, and to submit
findings and recommendations to the Court. In her Report, the
Magistrate Judge recommends that Respondent Warden Charles
Williams’ (“Respondent”) motion for summary
judgment (ECF Nos. 12 & 13) be granted. (See ECF
No. 36 at 2.) The Report sets forth in detail the relevant
facts and standards of law, and the Court incorporates them
here without recitation.
Magistrate Judge entered her Report on March 25, 2019,
recommending that Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF Nos. 12 & 13) be granted and that
Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) be denied.
(ECF No. 36 at 29.) Petitioner filed objections on June 5,
2019. (ECF No. 46.) Defendant filed a reply to
Petitioner’s objections on June 18, 2019. (ECF No. 51.)
The matter is ripe for consideration and the Court now makes
the following ruling.
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of any portion of the Report of the Magistrate
Judge to which a specific objection is made. The Court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or recommit the
matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). In the absence of a
timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a
de novo review, but instead must “only satisfy
itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record
in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2005).
Court declines to repeat the cogent analysis of the
Magistrate Judge with regard to every aspect of each Ground
for relief and will confine its analysis of the Report to
those portions about which Defendant raises an objection.
Magistrate Judge found that Ground One-in which Petitioner
contends that his plea of guilty was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made in violation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11-fails to raise a cognizable
federal habeas claim. (ECF No. 36 at 16–17.)
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Respondent
be granted summary judgment on this claim. (Id. at
objections, Petitioner concedes that “the Magistrate
Judge is right in reference to Rule 11, . . . and it should
not be used to make a claim, and the state court do not have
to follow that rule . . . .” (ECF No. 46 at 1 (errors
in original).) Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holdings in Boykins v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) and McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) somehow support his
assertion that the record in the case sub judice is
inadequate to show that Petitioner knowingly and
intelligently pleaded guilty. (See ECF No. 46 at
1–3.) Petitioner states, “Although the State
violated [R]ule 11, the State court and this court rather be
heard from a constitutional view point of due process,
” and he seeks to “amend his habeas petition to
cure this defect.” (Id. at 3 (errors in
original).) From this convoluted line of argument, Petitioner
proceeds to an irrelevant discussion of case law regarding
amendment of his petition. (Id. at 3.)
and McCarthy have no impact on Petitioner’s
Rule-11-based claim in Ground One. Petitioner’s
arguments fail to point the Court to any error in the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis or recommendation regarding
Ground One. Therefore, the objection is overruled.
second Ground for relief-in which he claims that his trial
counsel was ineffective “for [counsel’s] failure
to adequately inform [Petitioner] of the possibility to
suppress evidence gathered from law enforcement’s
warrantless placement of a mobile tracking device on his
vehicle” (see ECF No. 1 at 7)-was properly
exhausted in the state courts. In considering the merits of
Ground Two, the Magistrate Judge found that the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance claim was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court
precedent, specifically Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985). (ECF ...