United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Rock Hill Division
ORDER AND OPINION
action arises from the arrest of Plaintiff Christopher Clevon
Feaster on September 13, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff,
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
claims that the arrest violated his constitutional rights.
(Id.) The matter before the court is a review of the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
(“Report”) (ECF No. 64.)
reasons below, the court ACCEPTS the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF No.
64), GRANTS Defendant Alex Underwood's
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37), and
DENIES Defendants Sgt. Rickey Prevell
Sanders, Lt. Fourney, Sgt. Moss, Sgt. Graham, and Lt.
Moore's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards
which the court incorporates herein without full recitation.
On July 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the City
of Chester Police Department (“CCPD”) officers
Sgt. Rickey Prevell Sanders, Lt. Fourney, Sgt. Moss, Sgt.
Graham, and Lt. Moore (“City Defendants”). (ECF
jurisdictions, Gaston County, North Carolina, and York
County, South Carolina, charged Plaintiff with crimes that
led to his arrest on September 13, 2016. (ECF No. 64 at 2-3.)
A detective from the Gaston County Police Department
(“GCPD”) called the CCPD with notice that
Plaintiff had been identified as a suspect for crimes
committed in North Carolina. (Id. at 3.) CCPD knew
of Plaintiff's place of residence. (Id.) A
Gaston County Magistrate Judge issued a warrant for
Plaintiff's arrest and the GCPD detective joined officers
at the CCPD. (Id.) A detective from the York County
Sheriff's Office (“YCSO”) also arrived at
CCPD because Plaintiff was a suspect in robberies in York
County. (Id. at 4.)
allegedly arrested Plaintiff pursuant to the Gaston County
warrant. (Id.) However, Plaintiff claims that
officers failed to serve him with an arrest warrant, failed
to provide a basis for his arrest, and that neither YCSO nor
GCPD participated in his arrest (Id.) The GCPD
detective questioned Plaintiff at CCPD (Id. at 4-5)
and the CCPD booked Plaintiff in the Chester County Detention
Center. (Id. at 5.) YCSO obtained warrants for
Plaintiff's arrest on September 14, 2016, and transferred
Plaintiff to York County Detention Center. (Id.)
Upon dismissal of charges in York County, CCPD served
Plaintiff with charges for armed robbery in Chester County
and booked him into the Chester County Detention Center on
August 23, 2017. (Id.)
October 12, 2018, Defendant Sheriff Alex Underwood
(“Defendant Underwood”) filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 37.) On October 22, 2018, City
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 46.)
10, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report (ECF No. 64)
recommending that the court grant Defendant Underwood's
motion (ECF No. 37) and deny City Defendants' motion (ECF
No. 46). (Id. at 9-10.) On July 1, 2019, City
Defendants filed timely objections to the Report. (ECF No.
72.) On July 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed timely objections to
the Report. (ECF No. 74.)
Magistrate Judge's Report is made in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the
District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a
recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no
presumptive weight. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1976). The responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the court. Id. at 271. As
such, the court is charged with making de novo
determinations of those portions of the Report to which
specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In the
absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's
Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for
adopting the Report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d
198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, “in the absence of a
timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a
de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory
committee's note). Thus, the court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
court is required to interpret pro se documents
liberally and will hold those documents to a less stringent
standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978); see also
Hardin v. United States, C/A No. 7:12-cv-0118-GRA, 2012
WL 3945314, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2012). Additionally,
pro se documents must be construed in a favorable
manner, “no matter how inartfully pleaded, to see
whether they could provide a basis for relief.”
Garrett v. Elko, No. 95-7939, 1997 WL 457667, at *1
(4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1997). Although pro se documents
are liberally construed by federal courts, “[t]he
‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district
court should view pro se complaints does not
transform the court into an advocate.” Weller v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. for Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 391
(4th Cir. 1990).
only objects to the Report's recommendation that the
court grant Defendant Underwood's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 74.) The Report states that
“Plaintiff does not dispute [Defendant] Underwood's
statement” that “he is the Sheriff for Chester
County and ...