Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Buggs v. Warden Tyger River Correctional Institution

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

July 17, 2019

Arimatia Arpad Buggs, Petitioner,
v.
Warden Tyger River Correctional Institution, Respondent.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge

         Arimatia Arpad Buggs (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and is currently incarcerated at the Tyger River Correctional Institution. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal as time barred.

         BACKGROUND

         On April 11, 2000, Petitioner pled guilty in the Charleston County Court of General Sessions to the crimes of murder, attempted murder, first degree burglary, and attempted armed robbery and was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 30 years.[1] [Doc. 1 at 1]; see also State v. Arimatia Arpad Buggs, case No. F867197, F867198, F867199, F867200, available at https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case No. F867197, F867198, F867199, F867200) (last visited July 15, 2019).[2] A review of the Petition and state court records indicates that Petitioner did not appeal his convictions or sentences.

         On April 2, 2001, Petitioner filed a state court post conviction relief (“PCR”) action in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas at case No. 2001-CP-10-01209, asserting claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, involuntary plea, lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the attempted murder charge, prosecutorial misconduct, and actual innocence, among other claims. [Id. at 2]; see also Buggs v. State of South Carolina, No. 2001-CP-10-01209, available at https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search case No. “2001CP1001209”) (last visited July 15, 2019) (the “first PCR action”). The PCR court granted relief to Petitioner on his claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for the attempted murder charge, but denied relief on the remaining grounds. [Id. at 3.]

         Petitioner has attached to his Petition a copy of the PCR court's order of dismissal in his first PCR action, in which the PCR court extensively addressed the merits of Petitioner's claims. [Doc. 1-1 at 7-40.] As noted, the PCR court granted relief to Petitioner on his claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the attempted murder charge due to a change in the law. The PCR court explained as follows:

The Applicant entered a guilty plea to “attempted murder” on indictment 98-GS-10-8082 on April 11, 2000 and was sentenced to thirty (30) years. . . . [A]n intervening decision, State v. Sutton, 340 S.C. 393, 532 S.E.2d 283 (2000), on May 15, 2000 held that the offense of “attempted murder” is not recognized. The court therein held that the crime was covered by the offenses of assault and battery with intent to kill or assault with intent to kill. Therefore, the conviction for “attempted murder” and sentence is vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . . The South Carolina Department of Corrections is to receive a copy of this Order and is directed to correct its records and remove this particular conviction and sentence.

[Doc. 1-1 at 9-10.] The PCR court then carefully evaluated Petitioner's many other claims for relief, but concluded as follows:

Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that [Petitioner] has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations before or during his plea and sentencing proceedings. Therefore, this Application for Post-Conviction Relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice, with the exception of the Attempted Murder conviction and sentence on Indictment 98-GS-10-8082.
The “Attempted Murder” conviction and thirty year sentence on Indictment 98-GS-10-8082 is vacated due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

[Id. at 38.] The PCR court denied and dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice and dismissed the action on January 30, 2003. [Id. at 39.] Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the PCR court denied on February 26, 2003.

         On June 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a second state court PCR action in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas at case No. 2005-CP-10-02621, asserting claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, involuntary plea, prosecutorial misconduct, triggerman issue, among other claims. [Doc. 1 at 2]; see also Buggs v. State of South Carolina, No. 2005-CP-10-2621, available at https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search case No. “2005CP1002621”) (last visited July 15, 2019) (the “second PCR action”). The PCR court held a hearing on January 23, 2008, and subsequently dismissed the action on February 20, 2008.[3] [Doc. 1-1 at 1-6.] As explained by the PCR court in its order of dismissal of Petitioner's second PCR action, the parties reached an agreement on the issues presented in the PCR and placed the terms of their agreement on the record. Specifically, the PCR court approved the parties' agreement . . .

1) that [Petitioner] should receive a belated appeal from the denial of his [first] PCR, pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (S.C. 1991); and 2) that the issues preserved in the Austin appeal are those raised in a Motion for Reconsideration and supporting memorandum thereto, styled “Notice of Motion and Motion to Alter & Amend the Judgment, ” filed by [Petitioner] in response to the denial of his initial application for [PCR] relief; and 3) that, for the purposes of the above-referenced action, [Petitioner] waives all other issues raised in his Application herein.

[Doc. 1-1 at 5.] The PCR court held that . . .

[Petitioner] should receive a belated appeal from the denial of his PCR, pursuant to [Austin]. I further find the issues preserved in the Austin appeal are those raised in [Petitioner's] Motion for Reconsideration and supporting memorandum thereto, styled “Notice of Motion and Motion to Alter & Amend the Judgment, ” filed by [Petitioner] in response to the denial of his initial application for [PCR] relief. The remaining allegations in the [PCR] Application are dismissed with prejudice.

[Id. at 6.]

         While the PCR court granted Petitioner a belated appeal of his first PCR action pursuant to Austin, the South Carolina Court of Appeals denied the petition for writ of certiorari on January 6, 2010.

         In the instant Petition, Petitioner asserts the following grounds for federal habeas relief:[4] (1) ineffective assistance of counsel because plea counsel advised Petitioner to plead guilty to a charge that violated subject matter jurisdiction, failed to quash Petitioner's indictments during the preliminary hearing, and failed to advise Petitioner of his right to file a direct appeal [Doc. 1 at 5]; (2) actual innocence based on witness testimony [id. at 6-7]; (3) false arrest because the date of Petitioner's arrest was the day prior to the date on the arrest warrant [id. at 8]; and (4) appeal of guilty plea based on plea counsel's statement to Petitioner that he did not have a right to appeal [id. at 9-10]. For his relief, Petitioner requests that his sentence be vacated. [Id. at 14.]

         Regarding the timeliness of the instant Petition, Petitioner asserts that his “time ran out as a result of [i]neffective [a]ssistance of counsel.” [Id. at 13.] Specifically, Petitioner contends that his PCR counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, although he was later granted the right to a belated Austin appeal. [Id.] Petitioner also asserts that he has claimed actual innocence and that his “plea was coerced, involuntary, and [he] was duped into taking it at the instruction of [his] attorney.” [Id.]

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in the above-captioned case. The review was conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez,504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams,490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville,712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). While Petitioner has paid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.