United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Orangeburg Division
ORDER
Before
the court for review is the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) filed on May 11, 2019
(ECF No. 38). On August 6, 2018, Petitioner Corey Jawan
Robinson filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, seeking reversal of two (2) disciplinary
convictions and restoration of lost good time. (ECF No. 1 at
1.) In her Report, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal
of Robinson's Habeas Petition for “fail[ure] to
perfect his [Administrative Law Court] appeal of his
disciplinary conviction[s], [and] . . . therefore[, ]
fail[ing] to exhaust his state court
remedies.”[1] (ECF No. 38 at 9.) See also Robinson
v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2017)
(“State prisoners . . . must exhaust their state
remedies before filing a habeas petition in federal
court.”).
On
February 25, 2019, Robinson filed an Objection to the Report.
(ECF No. 42.) In a letter dated March 5, 2019, Robinson
informed the court that he was to be released from prison on
April 1, 2019, but still planned to prosecute his cases,
including the case at bar. (ECF No. 44 at 1.) Robinson
committed to notifying the court of his future change of
address and also requested that the court not dismiss his
cases. (Id.) On May 8, 2019, and June 6, 2019,
Robinson sent the court two letters providing the court with
his new address, which indicated to the court that he was no
longer incarcerated.[2] (ECF Nos. 46, 47.)
Section
2254 requires that a habeas petitioner be in custody at the
time the petition for habeas corpus is filed. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254; Woodfolk v. Maynard, 857 F.3d
531, 539 (4th Cir. 2017) (“It is well settled that the
‘in custody' requirement applies at the time a
petition is filed.”). However, “subsequent
release of a prisoner does not deprive a habeas court of
subject matter jurisdiction.” McFadden v.
Anderson, No. 3:07-35-RBH, 2007 WL 4268799, at *2
(D.S.C. Nov. 29, 2007) (citing Leonard v. Hammond,
804 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Establishing
jurisdiction is a matter of satisfying the ‘in
custody' statutory requirement.”)). But, subsequent
release of a prisoner may render the issues presented in a
habeas petition moot if there is no longer a live
controversy. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998) (“The more substantial question, however, is
whether petitioner's subsequent release caused the
petition to be moot because it no longer presented a case or
controversy under Article III, § 2, of the
Constitution.”); Leonard, 804 F.2d at 842-43
(finding that although the plaintiffs were released
subsequent to the filing of their habeas action, the
controversy was not moot because an exception to the mootness
doctrine applied).
“Generally,
a case becomes moot when ‘the issues presented are no
longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome.'” Via v. Clarke, No.
7:13CV513, 2014 WL 2619904, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 12, 2014)
(quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496
(1969)). But, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has identified two (2) exceptions to the
mootness doctrine in the context of a prisoner who is
released subsequent to the filing of their habeas petition:
(1) the “collateral consequences exception and (2) the
“capable of repetition but evading review
exception.” See Leonard, 804 F.2d at 842.
Several district courts have held that when a petitioner
challenges disciplinary convictions-not the conviction for
which they are incarcerated-and the loss of good time
credits, the collateral consequences exception does not
apply. See, e.g., Ellis v. Warden, No. CV
TDC-16-3855, 2017 WL 464372, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2017)
(“Ellis does not challenge the underlying conviction,
his sentence is completed, and there is no presumption or
demonstration of collateral consequences. The instant action,
therefore, is dismissed as moot.” (citing Bowler v.
Ashcroft, 46 Fed.Appx. 731, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that the petitioner's habeas challenge to the
United States Bureau of Prison's method of calculation of
good-time credits was moot where the petitioner had been
released from prison but was still on supervised release)));
Bassett v. Johnson, No. 7:11-CV-00396, 2011 WL
4793517, at *2 (W.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2011)
(“Plaintiff's release from the VDOC's custody
moots his habeas claims because he is free, no longer needs
good time credits, and is not subject to the VDOC's
security classifications.”); McFadden, 2007 WL
4268799, at *2 (“The [c]ourt finds that, since the
petitioner is not challenging his conviction but rather the
disciplinary infraction that led to his loss of good time
credits, the collateral consequences doctrine does not
apply.”); Wilson v. Seifert, No. CIV.A.
3:05CV102, 2007 WL 1238921 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 7, 2007)
(“In this case petitioner has been released. The issue
of good time credit is moot since it only relates to the date
of release. Release of petitioner renders the petition
moot.”). Here, Robinson has been released from prison,
does not challenge his underlying conviction, and there is no
presumption or demonstration of collateral consequences.
Accordingly, the court finds the collateral consequences
exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply.
The
court also finds the capable of repetition but evading review
exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply.
“‘[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies
only in exceptional situations.'” Spencer,
523 U.S. at 17 (alteration in original) (quoting City of
L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)). “Two
elements are required to employ this exception: ‘(1)
the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2)
there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party would be subjected to the same action
again.'” Leonard, 804 F.2d at 842
(alterations in original) (quoting Weinstein v.
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). The court's
conclusion in McFadden perfectly states this
court's conclusion here: “In the case at bar, there
is no reasonable possibility that the situation will recur.
Hopefully, [Robinson] will never return to prison.”
McFadden, 2007 WL 4268799, at *2. Therefore, the
capable of repetition but evading review exception to the
mootness doctrine also does not apply.
Thus,
while, ordinarily, “[a] challenge regarding revocation
of good-time credits . . . will support a federal habeas
claim because it addresses the duration of a petitioner's
sentence, ” Hall v. Bullock, No. 1:11CV440,
2012 WL 4793738, at *1 (M.D. N.C. Oct. 9, 2012) (citing
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)),
because Robinson is no longer incarcerated, and none of the
exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply to his Habeas
Petition, the court finds Robinson's Habeas Petition is
moot. Accordingly, the court REJECTS AS MOOT
the Magistrate Judge's Report (ECF No. 38) and
DISMISSES AS MOOT Robinson's Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1).
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] At the time Robinson filed his Habeas
Petition, he was a state prisoner at Turbeville Correctional
Institution in Turbeville, South Carolina. (ECF No. 1 at
1.)
[2] The court searched for Robinson on the
South Carolina Department of Corrections'
(“SCDC”) website using the “Incarcerated
Inmate Search, ” and Robinson did not appear among the
search results. Thus, based on Robinson's letters (ECF
Nos. 46, 47) and SCDC's online records, the court
concludes Robinson is no longer incarcerated. See also
Crittendon v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. CA
4:11-2997-TMC-TER, 2012 WL 2871755, at *2 (D.S.C. July 12,
2012) (“The court takes judicial notice ...