United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN
F. MCDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
matter is before the court on the defendants' motion for
summary judgment (doc. 37). The plaintiff, a state
prisoner[1], filed this action pro se and in forma
pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the
provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section
636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.),
this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial
matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations
to the district court.
The
plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on May 9,
2018 (doc. 1). On October 4, 2018, the defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment (doc. 37). On the same date, the
court issued an order in accordance with Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising the
plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and of
the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond
to the motion (doc. 38). On October 15, 2018, the plaintiff
filed a response in opposition (doc. 42), and on October 22,
2018, the plaintiff filed an additional response to the
motion (doc. 44). On June 24, 2019, the undersigned
instructed the parties to provide additional briefing with
respect to the application of the Supreme Court's holding
in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) to the
instant action (doc. 50). On July 3, 2019, the defendants
filed their additional brief (doc. 53). The plaintiff filed
his additional brief on July 8, 2019, along with a motion to
stay (docs. 54; 55). Accordingly, the defendants' motion
for summary judgment is now ripe for review.
ALLEGATIONS
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The
plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his rights
during an encounter that included a search of his residence,
resulting in drug charges against him and others. The
defendants are investigators with the Laurens County
Sheriff's Office. The plaintiff contends that while in
his home, he learned that law enforcement officers were on
his property. When he opened the door and stepped outside, he
was immediately handcuffed and read his rights (doc. 1 at
5-6, 7). Inv. Nations went inside the house, then came back
out to send for a search warrant (id. at 6, 7). The plaintiff
alleges that Inv. Blackmon then signed an affidavit in
support of the warrant, which falsely stated that the
plaintiff “allowed” the officers to enter the
house, and that the plaintiff was “in the bathroom area
[where] a confidential source said narcotics were
hidden” when the plaintiff was found (id. at 4, 6, 7).
The plaintiff also points to other purported discrepancies in
the affidavit as proof the affidavit was false, resulting in
an improper search warrant.
While
the plaintiff does not appear to deny the presence of drugs
(and indeed has pled guilty to related drug charges as
addressed below), he takes issue with the defendants'
actions, specifically alleging that the defendants violated
his Fourth Amendment rights by illegally entering his home,
and presenting false information to the magistrate to obtain
the search warrant (id. at 4). He seeks monetary damages to
compensate him for lost income and stress (id. at 6).
APPLICABLE
LAW AND ANALYSIS
This
complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
“‘is not itself a source of substantive
rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'”
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)
(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3
(1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a
private right of action to vindicate violations of
‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws' of the United States.”
Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state
a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and
(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has
moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to
the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed
“material” if proof of its existence or
nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under
the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is
“genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a
reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant.
Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue
has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and
ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving
party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,
655 (1962).
The
party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden
of demonstrating to the district court that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has
made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to
survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the
allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must
demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give
rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this
standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to
withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials,
without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of
the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Communications
Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985),
overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248.
Heck v.
Humphrey
With
respect to the plaintiff's civil claims that his rights
were violated by the defendants on May 25, 2017, it appears
they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in
order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the
Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully
challenged. The Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a
determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to
a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is
not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). This is known as
the “favorable termination” requirement. See
Wilson v. Johnson,535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir.
2008). As noted in the publicly-available online records for
the Laurens County Eighth Judicial Circuit (as well as
documents filed with the defendants' motion for summary
judgment), the plaintiff pled guilty to manufacturing
methamphetamine 2nd offense, and the disposal or assistance
in disposal of methamphetamine waste 2nd or subsequent
offense (case No. 2017A3010100501 and 2017A3010100506) in
exchange for the dismissal of other charges, including some
arising from the same incident (attempt to possess unlawful
substances; possession of less than one gram of ice crank or
crack cocaine, 3rd or subsequent offense; possession with
intent to distribute drugs near a school; and possession of
marijuana charges (case No. 2017A3010100485, 2017A3010100502,
2017A3010100503, and 2017A3010100504)) (docs. 37-3; 53 at 2).
See Laurens County Public Index, https://
publicindex.sccourts.org/Laurens/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx,
(enter the plaintiff's name) (last visited July 9, 2019).
In his response to the undersigned's June 24, 2019,
order, the plaintiff appears to ...