United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Dreyah Moorae Bey, a/k/a or f/k/a Andrea Moire Coaxum, Plaintiff,
Jobany Colon; County of Charleston, South Carolina; Nina L. Savas, Assistant Solicitor; Judge Jennifer McCoy, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRISTOW MARCHANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, Dreyah Moorae Bey,
also known as or formerly known as Andrea Moire Coaxum, pro
se, and is before the Court for pre-service review.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); In re Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir.
1997)[pleadings by non-prisoners should also be screened].
Under established local procedure in this judicial district,
a careful review has been made of the pro se complaint herein
pursuant to the procedural provisions of § 1915, and in
light of the following precedents: Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden,
Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en
banc); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th
asserts that she brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and claims that her statutory rights under 18
U.S.C. § 242 have been violated. She also appears to
allege state law claims. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at
3-5. Plaintiff submitted various attachments to her
Complaint, including a document titled "IN THE NATURE OF
SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND MARITIME CLAIMS
RULES C(6)"; copies of Defendant Jobany Colon's
criminal sentencing sheets; General Services Administration
(GSA) Standard Forms 24, 24, 25, 25A, and 28; the United
Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; a
document titled "AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIM"; purported
certified copies of various public documents; a purported
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Financing Statement; a document
titled "SECURITY AGREEMENT/FEE SCHEDULE/DBA"; and a
document titled "THE MOORISH DIVINE AND NATIONAL
MOVEMENT OF THE WORLD LEGAL NOTICE! NAME DECLARATION,
CORRECTION PROCLAMATION AND PUBLICATION". (ECF No.
asserts that Defendant Jobany Colon murdered her son, Davon
Smith, Jr., on May 19, 2017. ECF No. 1 at 5. Records from
Charleston County indicate that on January 10, 2019, Colon
pled guilty and was sentenced to twenty-five years
imprisonment for manslaughter/voluntary manslaughter, and
pled guilty and was sentenced to five years as to a charge of
weapons/possession of a weapon during a violent crime. See
Charleston County Public Index,
CourtAgency= 10001 &Casenum=2017A
0273677652 (weapons). Defendant Nina L. Savas, Assistant
Solicitor, was the prosecutor, and Defendant Judge Jennifer
McCoy was the presiding judge, for Colon's criminal
cases. As relief, Plaintiff requests:
ENFORCE TORT CLAIM DUE TO COURT'S DISHONOR OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE WITHIN TIMEFRAME - ACCUSED ACCEPTED PLEA DEAL
& WAIVED HIS RIGHTS.
ECF No. 1 at 6. In the documents attached to her Complaint,
Plaintiff requests that she be awarded $700, 000, 000, and
that twelve of her son's relatives each be awarded $350,
000, 000. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5-6).
1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in
federal court without paying the administrative costs of
proceeding with the lawsuit. However, to protect against
possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a
district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the
action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted," or
"seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A
finding of frivolousness can be made where the complaint
"lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 31. Hence, under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal
theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. at 319. Further, while this Court is
also required to liberally construe pro se documents, holding
them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)), the requirement of liberal construction does not
mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in a pleading
to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable
in a federal court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case
Plaintiffs Complaint is subject to dismissal because it is
characterized by what some courts have described as
"buzzwords" or "legalistic gibberish."
See, e.g.. Rochester v. McKie, No.
8:11-797, 2011 WL 2671228, at * 1 (D.S.C. July 8, 2011)
(citing Yocum v. Summers, No. 91-3648, 1991 WL
171389, at *l (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1991)). Although Plaintiff
lists one criminal statute (18 U.S.C. § 242) as an
alleged basis of federal jurisdiction (which is discussed
further below), her allegations are so generally
incomprehensible and filled with what could only be
considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory,
and unsupported comments, or "gibberish," that it
is unclear what is to be made of them. See Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) [Noting that
federal courts lack power to entertain claims that are
"so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely
devoid of merit"]: see also Livingston v. Adirondack
Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434 (2nd Cir. 1998); Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994)[Affirming dismissal of
plaintiffs suit as frivolous where allegations were
conclusory and nonsensical on their face]. Thus, Plaintiffs
Complaint is in violation of the directive in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a) that pleadings shall contain "a
short and plain statement" of the basis for the
court's jurisdiction and of the basis for a plaintiffs
claims against each defendant. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)[requiring, in order to
avoid dismissal, '"a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice
of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it
attached to her Complaint a copy of what appears to be a tort
claim (requesting that she and her son's relatives be
paid monetary damages) which she allegedly presented to the
"Solicitor's Office" and "The Charleston
County Judicial Court" with copies of "Bid
Bond", "Payment Bond", and "Affidavit of
Individual Surety" forms from the GSA. It is unclear how
these forms, used in conjunction with federal government
contracting bids, apply to Plaintiffs allegations against a
private individual (Colon) and the State of South Carolina
Defendants. Moreover, although Plaintiff attached a copy of
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples to her Complaint, there is nothing to indicate that
she may bring a claim pursuant to it, and this document is
not a legally binding instrument under international law. See
El v. Delgado, No. 1:10CV38, 2010 WL 5201195
(N.D.W.Va. Nov. 5, 2010)(citing to "Frequently Asked
Questions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
has also failed to state any theory for which she has a cause
of action under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which sets
forth that one of its primary purposes is "to simplify,
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions." UCC, § 1-103(a)(1)[Construction of
[Uniform Commercial Code] to Promote its Purposes and
Policies; Applicability of Supplemental Principles of Law].
Court proceedings, such as the civil § 1983 action she
brings here are not "commercial transactions."
See, e.g.. Bey v. Jefferson, No.
2:17-1007-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 9250348 (D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2017),
adopted by 2017 WL 1956979 (D.S.C. May 11, 2017).
response to a question on the Complaint form asking what
federal constitutional or statutory right Plaintiff claims
was violated, she wrote "USC Title 18 Part 1 Chapter 13
§ 242." ECF No. 1 at 4. However, this is a criminal
statute that does not give rise to civil liability or
authorize a private right of action. See United States v.
Oguaju, 76 Fed.Appx. 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003)[finding
that the District Court properly dismissed defendant's
claim filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242
because he had no private right of action under either of
those criminal statutes]; Wagner v. United States,
377 F.Supp.2d 505, 510-511 (D.S.C. 2005) [§ 241 is a
criminal statute that provides no private cause of action];
Rockfeller v. U.S.Ct. of Appeals Office, 248
F.Supp.2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003)[the plaintiff was precluded
from bringing case under § 242 because there is no
private cause of action under this criminal
statute](collecting cases). Here, although Plaintiff states
that she is asserting her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, she has failed to allege any comprehensible claim that
any of her rights under the Constitution or the laws of the
United States were violated.
although Plaintiff requests monetary damages on behalf of
some of her family members, none of these purported
plaintiffs has signed the Complaint. To the extent that
Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims on behalf of these
family members, she may not do so. While an individual's
right to represent himself or herself pro se in federal court
is protected by statute; see 28 U.S.C. § 1654; the right
to litigate one's claims without an attorney "does
not create a coordinate right to litigate for
others." Myers v. Loudon Co. Pub. Sch., 418
F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Asad ...