United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
ORDER AND OPINION
matter is before this court upon Defendant Fredrecquious
Wise's Motion for Reconsideration of the court's
Sentencing Order entered on March 29, 2018. (ECF No. 45.)
Defendant seeks review of the court's Order sentencing
him to eighty-three (83) months' imprisonment within the
United States Bureau of Prisons. (Id.) Specifically,
Defendant requests that the court reconsider and amend his
sentence downward. (Id.) For the reasons set forth
herein, the court DENIES Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
February 24, 2017, a federal grand jury indicted Defendant
for one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. (ECF No. 2.) On October 25, 2017, Defendant entered a
guilty plea to one count of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and 924(e). (ECF No. 27.) On March 29,
2018, Defendant was sentenced to eighty-three (83)
months' imprisonment within the United States Bureau of
Prisons, followed by a term of three (3) years of supervised
release. (ECF No. 39.)
filed his Motion for Reconsideration on June 6, 2019,
requesting that the court exercise its discretion regarding
the sentencing guidelines. (ECF No. 45.) Defendant requests
reconsideration of his sentence based on the alleged
circumstances that led to his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. (Id.) Defendant asks for
leniency based on circumstances of his surrounding
environment. (Id.) These circumstances include
Defendant becoming an orphan at the age of one (1), after
witnessing his mother being shot to death in front of him.
(Id.) Defendant also informed the court that he has
a wife, two (2) biological children and four (4)
step-children. (Id.) He also claims that he needed a
gun for protection after having been pistol whipped.
(Id.) The United States of America (“the
Government”) has not filed a response to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and federal case law
recognize that motions for reconsideration may be proper in a
criminal setting. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b)
(“A judge may regulate practice in any manner
consistent with federal law, these rules, and the local rules
of the district.”); United States v. Dieter,
429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976) (“The fact that appeals are now
routed to the courts of appeals does not affect the wisdom of
giving district courts the opportunity promptly to correct
their own alleged errors.”); United States v.
Randall, 666 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). However,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly
provide formal provisions governing motions for
reconsideration. See United States v. Rollins, 607
F.3d 500, 502 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Fuentes-Morales, No. 5:14-cr-00556, 2017 WL 541052, at
*1 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2017).
court is guided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when
determining if the reconsideration of a sentence is
appropriate. Rollins, 607 F.3d at 502; United
States v. Carroll, No. 1:16-cr-00632-JMC-10, 2018 WL
3802195, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2018);
Fuentes-Morales, 2017 WL 541052, at *1. A court may
alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the movant shows: (1) a
change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence that was not
readily discoverable at the time of the initial hearing; or
(3) a clear error of law causing manifest injustice.
Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407
(4th Cir. 2010).
Rule 59(e) motions cannot be used as opportunities to
re-litigate issues already decided just because the litigant
is not happy with the result. See Hutchinson v.
Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993)
(“[M]ere disagreement does not support a Rule 59(e)
motion.”); Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Geometric
Software Sols. & Structure Works LLC, No.
1:06cv956(JCC), 2007 WL 2021901, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 6,
2007) (“A party's mere disagreement with the
court's ruling does not warrant a Rule 59(e) motion, and
such a motion should not be used to ‘rehash'
arguments previously presented or to submit evidence which
should have been previously submitted.” (quoting
Rouse v. Nielsen, 851 F.Supp. 717, 734 (D.S.C.
Defendant moves to have his sentence reconsidered because he
“feared for his life, ” and he believes that his
rough upbringing, particularly his orphan status at the age
of one (1), should have been taken into consideration. (ECF
No. 45.) In order to grant a motion for reconsideration there
must be: (1) a change in the controlling law; (2) new
evidence that was not readily discoverable at the time of the
initial hearing; or (3) a clear error of law causing manifest
injustice. Robinson, 599 F.3d at 407. A motion to
reconsider cannot be granted when a defendant simply wants
the court to review what the court has already thought about
and ruled upon. See United States v. Dickerson, 971
F.Supp. 1023, 1024 (E.D. Va. 1997).
case, there has been no change in law that would warrant
reconsideration. Defendant pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e). (ECF No. 27.)
Defendant argues that he should be given “relief under
this statute.” (ECF No. 45.) However, this argument is
without merit because 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) makes it
illegal for any felon, one who has been convicted in any
court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, to possess a firearm. 18 U.S.C. §
922 (g)(1) permits a maximum term of imprisonment of ten (10)
years. Based on the information set forth in the
Presentencing Report, the sentencing guidelines recommended
seventy-seven (77) to ninety-six (96) months of imprisonment
for Defendant. (ECF No. 38.) Defendant was sentenced to
eight-three (83) months of imprisonment, which is within the
sentencing guidelines range for Defendant. (ECF No. 39.)
has also failed to provide any new evidence that would
qualify him for relief. To qualify as new evidence, a party
(1) the evidence is newly discovered since the judgment was
entered; (2) due diligence on the part of the movant to
discover the new evidence has been exercised; (3) the
evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the
evidence is material; and (5) the evidence is such that is
likely to produce a new outcome if the case were retried, or
is such that would require the judgment to be amended.
Boryan v. United States, 884 F.2d 767, 771 (4th Cir.
1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 60). Defendant has failed to
provide any new evidence that meets the standard
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60. The circumstances of the crime, as
well as the information Defendant presents in mitigation of
this crime were already detailed in both the Pretrial and