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Jackson v. Eastman Chemical Co.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Orangeburg Division

May 20, 2019

Jacob S. Jackson, Plaintiff,
Eastman Chemical Company and Mundy Maintenance Services and Operations, LLC, Defendants.


          G. Michelle Grill United States District Judge

         Plaintiff Jacob S. Jackson filed this action alleging that he was injured as a result of the negligence of Defendants Eastman Chemical Company (“Eastman”) and Mundy Maintenance Services and Operations, LLC (“Mundy”) (together “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.)

         This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 126) of the Order entered on October 23, 2018 (the “October Order”), granting Eastman's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 53). (ECF No. 112 at 19-20.) Eastman opposes Plaintiff's Motion asserting that the October Order “correctly granted Eastman's Motion to Dismiss.” (ECF No. 127 at 10.) For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.


         This case arises out of an industrial accident that occurred on December 6, 2016, at a chemical manufacturing facility (the “Facility”) located “on the banks of the Congaree River near Sandy Run a few miles northeast of Gaston in Calhoun County, South Carolina.” (ECF No. 58 at 2.) Eastman operated the Facility from 1967 until 20ll manufacturing polyethylene terephthalate (“PET”), a material “commonly used in soda bottles.” (ECF No. 1 at 3 ¶¶ 9-11.) On January 31, 2011, Eastman sold specified parts of the Facility to DAK Americas, LLC (“DAK”), “a subsidiary of Alpek S.A.B. de C.V., a Mexican chemical manufacturing company.” (Id. ¶ 11.) “DAK purchased . . . polymer and chemical manufacturing lines, certain on-site utilities and services to support such operations, but specifically excluded some retained facilities at the Plant.” (ECF No. 58 at 3.) “Among the retained assets [of Eastman] were: 1, 000 acres of land, six to ten buildings and four production lines out of thirteen which are making substantially similar products to those produced prior to the sale (the ‘Retained Assets').” (Id. (citing ECF No. 78-1 at 29:14-30:25, 32:3-14, 53:1-25 & ECF No. 78-2 at 28:13-29:9, 53:3-15).) Additionally, “[w]hen Eastman sold the Facility to DAK, nearly all of Eastman's 400 employees at the site became DAK employees at the time of the sale and continued doing the same jobs.” (ECF No. 53 at 4 (citing ECF No. 78-1 at 57:1-23).) As a result, DAK's employees “operate[d] and maintain[ed] Eastman's retained lines the same way that they did while they were employed by Eastman.” (ECF No. 78-1 at 57:13-17.)

         “Two contracts between Eastman and DAK memorialize that agreement.” (ECF No. 53 at 5.) “First, under the Operating Agreement, Eastman pays DAK to provide its employees to operate the Eastman Retained lines, which generally run twenty-four hours a day.” (Id. (referencing ECF No. 53-3).) “The operators report to supervisors within DAK's chain of command, and the DAK Area Manager serves as the liaison to Eastman.” (Id.) “Second, there is a separate Services Agreement, under which Eastman pays DAK to provide, among other things, employees from DAK's maintenance department to perform maintenance and repairs on the Retained Lines.” (Id. (referencing ECF No. 53-4).) “DAK's employees, including Plaintiff [Jackson], were Eastman's operations and maintenance workforce at the time of the Incident pursuant to the Operations Agreement and Services Agreement.” (Id. at 6 (citations omitted).) As an operations and maintenance worker, Jacob Jackson did the same type of work for DAK after the sale as he did for Eastman before the sale. (ECF No. 78-1 at 60:1-6.)

         After purchasing the Facility, DAK contracted with Mundy to “provide[] maintenance services at the site.” (ECF No. 78-2 at 126:19-20.) Employees of Mundy were asked on December 3, 2016, “to heat a drain pipe [] near the Pump with a torch flame.” (ECF No. 55 at 3.)

         On December 6, 2016, Jackson, along with DAK co-workers, Kevin Vann and Alton Ray Zeigler, were assigned to perform preventative maintenance on line A, one of the four Eastman “Retained Asset” production lines, which involved draining the AC-11 loop to clean out any molten material and pulling/separating the AC-11 pump from its housing to replace a leaking seal. (ECF No. 78-1 at 109:5-11, 114:9-14, 115:7-15 & 135:2-24.) During the performance of this maintenance, Jackson was injured as “the result of an explosion which covered [] Jackson in the superheated chemical monomer and propelled an industrial pump, which weighs approximately 300 pounds, almost nine feet across a workspace before coming to rest as it put a hole in a cement block wall.” (ECF No. 58 at 1.)

         As a result of the foregoing, Jackson filed an action in this court on April 19, 2017, alleging claims against Eastman for negligence and negligent failure to warn and against Mundy for negligence. (ECF No. 1 at 8 ¶ 57-12 ¶ 75.) Additionally, Jackson alleged that he is entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages. (Id. at 12 ¶ 76-13 ¶ 79.) After engaging in court-ordered jurisdictional discovery with Jackson (see ECF No. 38 at 1 ¶ 2), Eastman filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction on November 30, 2017, asserting that Jackson was a “statutory employee” of Eastman under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (the “Act”), SC Code §§ 42-1-10 to -19-50 (2017), such that the Act is Jackson's exclusive remedy. (ECF No. 53.) In his December 21, 2017 Response in Opposition, Jackson expressly did not agree that he was Eastman's statutory employee for purposes of its Motion. (ECF No. 58.) Thereafter, the court entered the October Order granting Eastman's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 112.)

         On February 26, 2019, Jackson filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 126.)


         In the October Order, the court made the following observations in granting Eastman's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 53):

To determine whether Jackson was a statutory employee of Eastman at the time [] he was injured, the court considered the parties' evidence concerning Eastman's general trade, business, or occupation. See Poch, 747 S.E.2d at 761 (“[T]his Court has the power and duty to review the entire record and decide the jurisdictional facts in accord with the preponderance of the evidence.” (citation omitted)). Upon its review, the court observes that the parties dispute what is Eastman's business, trade, or occupation. Eastman asserts that it is in the business of producing specialty chemicals. (ECF No. 78-1 at 22:21-23; ECF No. 78-2 at 31:10-13, 166:19-167:4.) Jackson asserts that Eastman is “a chemical product sales company, selling chemicals produced by DAK employees on equipment owned by Eastman” because it “does not receive the raw materials, does not have any employees capable of running the operations of the lines, does not remove the product from the line, and does not place the product into shipping containers.” (ECF No. 59 at 23 (citing ECF No. 78-2 at 92:15-93:19)). Despite the parties' contrasting positions, there is no dispute of fact that Eastman's business requires the presence of chemical product and without such chemical product, Eastman cannot sell or produce anything. Moreover, caselaw does not necessarily require that such chemical product be exclusively produced by Eastman's employees. See Singleton, 533 F.Supp. at 890 (“[A] person is performing the trade, business or occupation of the employer if the person contracts with the owner to perform a duty which is essential to the function of the owner's continued business despite the fact the owner may never have performed the same chore with his own employees.” (citations omitted)).
On the day Jackson was injured, there is also no dispute of fact that he was performing preventative maintenance on one of the lines that produces chemicals for Eastman. (ECF No. 78-1 at 112:2-117:2.) The appellate courts of South Carolina have held that maintenance considerations are an important part of a statutory employer's trade, business, or occupation. In Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 2 S.E.2d 825 (S.C. 1939), “the [South Carolina Supreme] Court found that an independent contractor who was hired to paint telephone poles on behalf of Duke Power was a statutory employee under the Workmen's Compensation Law on the basis that Marchbanks was engaged in part of the defendant's business, because the maintenance of utility poles was necessary to the distribution of electricity.” Singleton, 533 F.Supp. at 890 (citing Marchbanks, 2 S.E.2d at 837). In Boseman ...

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