United States District Court, D. South Carolina
ORDER AND NOTICE
SHIVA
V. HODGES COLUMBIA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Mario
Antwan Lloyd (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed this complaint against several
Charleston County Detention Center (“CCDC”)
employees, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)
and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned
is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit
findings and recommendations to the district judge. I.
Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff is a pretrial
detainee held at CCDC. [ECF No. 1 at 4]. In his original
complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, while housed in CCDc
Special Management Unit (“SMU”) from March 2,
2019, to March 17, 2019, defendants Roberts and Scott removed
his personal belongings; defendants Sandova, McKeller, and
Tipton punished him for speaking; and defendants Roberts,
Scott, and Sandova unlawfully looked through his legal mail.
Id. at 6-8. In addition, Plaintiff challenged
various conditions of his confinement, asserted racial and
gender discrimination, and alleged Robinson failed to respond
to grievances. Id. He seeks monetary damages and
termination of the responsible parties. Id.
Plaintiff
filed his complaint on April 8, 2019. [ECF No. 1]. On April
19, 2019, the court notified Plaintiff that, because he sued
each of the defendants in his or her official capacity, the
Eleventh Amendment barred his claims and his complaint was
subject to summary dismissal. [ECF No. 7]. The court granted
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure this
pleading deficiency and alerted Plaintiff his amended
complaint would replace his original complaint and, thus,
should be complete in itself. Id.
On May
1, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. [ECF No. 9].
The amended complaint continues to name each defendant in his
or her official capacity. Id. at 2-4. In addition,
the amended complaint alleges only “cruel and unusual
punishment, no shoes no mat no clothes no visits no phone
legal call, going through my legal work.” Id.
at 6.
II.
Discussion
A.
Standard of Review
Plaintiff
filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which
permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal
court without prepaying the administrative costs of
proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible
abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court
to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous
or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A
finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a
meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se
complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with
liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant
to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In
evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's
allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of
N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated
liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that
if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a
valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should
do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction
does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in
the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently
cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.
1990).
B.
Analysis
A
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must
liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States
Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than
make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677‒78 (2009); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its
face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the
complaint's factual allegations, not its legal
conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678‒79.
To
state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, [1] an aggrieved party must sufficiently
allege he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of
his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
[United States] Constitution and laws” by a
“person” acting “under color of state
law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see
generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed.
2014).
1.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The
Eleventh Amendment provides, “[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const.
amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held the
Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by
one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to
suits against a state per se, but also to suits against
agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v.
Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir.
2001).
Because
the defendants in this case are employees of a South Carolina
county, when acting in their official capacities, they are
considered an arm of the state and not a “person”
within the meaning § 1983. See Pennington v. Kershaw
Cnty., S.C., No. 3:12-1509-JFA-SVH, 2013 WL 2423120, at
*4 (D.S.C. June 4, 2013) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-10
and applying the Eleventh Amendment to a county as “a
political subdivision of the State”); Chisolm v.
Cannon, C/A No. 4:02-3473-RBH, 2006 WL 361375, at *5-6
(D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2006) (finding Charleston County Detention
Center entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of
the state); Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525
(S.C. 1992) (employees of a county Sheriff are state
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