United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
Terry D. Sexton, Plaintiff,
v.
South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company, Defendants.
ORDER
This
matter is before the court for review of the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation filed on November 9,
2018. (ECF No. 18.) Within the Report, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that the court grant Defendants South Carolina
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Southern Farm Bureau
Casualty Insurance Company, and Southern Farm Bureau Life
Insurance Company's (collectively,
“Defendants”) Motion for Partial Dismissal on the
Pleadings (ECF No. 14), which specifically concerns Plaintiff
Terry D. Sexton's (“Plaintiff”) first cause
of action under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and
second cause of action for breach of contract arising under
the laws of South Carolina. (Id. at 3.) For the
reasons set forth below, the court ACCEPTS
the Magistrate Judge's Report (ECF No. 18) and
GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Partial
Dismissal on the Pleadings (ECF No. 14) as to Plaintiff's
first and second causes of action.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The
Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards,
which the court adopts herein without a full recitation. (ECF
No. 18 at 1-3.) As background, Plaintiff was first employed
by Defendants in 1985 as an agent and eventually became an
Agency Manager in 2002. (ECF No. 1-1 at 6 ¶ 5.)
Purportedly, Plaintiff “was never reprimanded or
written up and consistently met or exceeded his expectations
not only in sales, but also as a manager . . . .”
(Id. at 6 ¶ 6.) In March 2014, Plaintiff
attended a meeting with representatives of Defendants and was
“told that he had a ‘bad attitude,' that his
County Board ‘did not trust him' and that
Defendants took issue to the fact that he did not live in
Pickens County . . . .” (Id. at 6 ¶ 7.)
After the meeting, Plaintiff agreed to move to Pickens County
“to appease Defendants.” (Id.) On
January 8, 2016, Plaintiff's employment was terminated,
and Plaintiff contends that Defendants only stated, regarding
his termination, that “we are going in a different
direction.” (Id. at 7 ¶ 9.) In addition
to the termination, Plaintiff claims that Defendants
“promised” that its employees would be treated as
“independent contractors” and retain “the
rewards that come with business ownership.”
(Id. at 7 ¶ 10.) Plaintiff submits that
Defendant “as a result of misclassification and
improper characterization of its [a]gent-employees as
‘independent contractors,' [Defendants] fail[ed] to
provide its [employees] the same retirement, health, and
other benefits it provides to all its other regular employees
pursuant to several employee benefit pension and welfare
plains and [they] unjustly enrich[] [themselves] by avoiding
the business costs of extending said benefits to its
[a]gent-employees.” (Id. at 8 ¶ 15.)
On
February 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the
Richland County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5-11.)
Within his Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for violations
of the ADEA, Family Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, and
breach of contract under the common law of South Carolina.
(Id. at 8-11.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages,
reasonable attorney's fees and costs, lost wages,
liquidated damages, and other lost benefits. (Id.)
On April 4, 2018, Defendants removed Plaintiff's action
to the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, invoking the court's jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1441. (ECF No. 1.)
Defendants
filed their Motion for Partial Dismissal on the Pleadings on
September 18, 2018. (ECF No. 14.) Within their Motion,
Defendants first assert that Plaintiff's ADEA claim is
untimely. (ECF No. 14-1 at 4-5.) Second, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff's contract claim fails because “an
employment contract cannot be founded upon a contract for
at-will employment.” (Id. at 5-6.) For those
reasons, Defendants request the court to dismiss
Plaintiff's first and second causes of action.
(Id. at 6.) Plaintiff did not respond to
Defendants' Motion, and nor did Plaintiff respond to an
order from the Magistrate Judge specifically ordering him to
advise the court as to whether he wishes to retain his first
and second causes of action against Defendants. (ECF Nos. 16,
18.)
The
Magistrate Judge filed her Report on November 9, 2018. (ECF
No. 18.) Within the Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends
that the court grant Defendants' Motion for Partial
Dismissal on the Pleadings (ECF No. 14) as it relates to
Plaintiff's first and second causes of action.
(Id. at 3.) Specifically, the Magistrate Judge
reasons that Plaintiff “has filed no opposition to
[D]efendants' [M]otion for [Partial Dismissal] on the
[P]leadings, despite a warning from the court that failure to
do so may result in these claims being decided on the record
. . . or dismissed with prejudice for failure to
prosecute.” (Id. at 2-3.) In addition, the
Magistrate Judge informed the parties of their right to file
specific, written objections to the Report and the
consequences of failing to file specific objections.
(Id. at 4.) To date, neither party has filed any
objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
Magistrate Judge's Report is made in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the
District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a
recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no
presumptive weight. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1976). The responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the court. Id. at 271. As
such, the court is charged with making de novo determinations
of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which
specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In the
absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's
Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for
adopting the Report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d
198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, “in the absence of a
timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a
de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that
there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to
accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.
2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's
note). Thus, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation
or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
III.
DISCUSSION
In the
absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's
Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for
adopting the Report. See Camby, 718 F.2d at 199.
Furthermore, a failure to file specific written objections to
the Report results in a party's waiver of the right to
appeal from the judgment of the court based upon such
recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court
concludes that the Magistrate Judge's Report accurately
summarizes the law and correctly applies it to the instant
case. (ECF No. 18.) Because no specific objections were filed
by either party and the court discerns no clear error within
the Report, the court adopts the Report herein.
Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d
at 199.
IV.
CONCLUSION
After
careful consideration of the Magistrate Judge's Report
and the record, the court ACCEPTS the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 18)
and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for
Partial Dismissal on the Pleadings (ECF No. 14) as to
Plaintiffs first and second causes of action.
IT
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