United States District Court, D. South Carolina
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
McCullough, Jr., (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro
se, is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution
Williamsburg in Salters, South Carolina, a facility of the
federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). He filed the
instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c)
(D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such
petitions and submit findings and recommendations to the
district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned
recommends the district judge dismiss the Petition in this
case without requiring Respondent to file an answer.
Factual and Procedural Background
argues the BOP's delayed implementation of the First Step
Act's good time credits “fix”
violates due process of law and the rules of statutory
construction. ECF No. 11 at 6. Petitioner contends that under
the First Step Act an inmate showing exemplary compliance
with institutional rules receives 54 days of good time,
instead of the previously awarded 47 days. Id. at 7.
Petitioner argues the BOP has continued to only provide 47
days of credit, claiming the BOP has “embarked on a
play of words of ambiguous language” to “delay or
prevent [it] from having to implement such change in law
(mandate)” until it develops an unrelated risk and
needs assessment system. Id. Petitioner argues the
congressional mandate involving the 54 days does not require
the BOP to create a particular system before the mandate is
applied. Id. Petitioner seeks an order compelling
the BOP to comply with the congressional mandate and
immediately implement the 54 days into the calculation of his
sentence. Id. at 8.
Standard of Review
established local procedure in this judicial district, a
careful review has been made of this Petition pursuant to the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United
States District Court,  the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are
held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th
Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally
construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow
the development of a potentially meritorious case.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In
evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's
allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of
N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated
liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that
if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a
valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should
do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction
does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in
the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently
cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.
is required to exhaust his administrative remedies within the
BOP before submitting a § 2241 Petition in this case.
Although § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion
requirement, courts consistently require prisoners to exhaust
their administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas review
under § 2241. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (requiring exhaustion
in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 matter); McClung v.
Shearin, 90 Fed.Appx. 444, 445 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“Federal prisoners must exhaust their administrative
remedies prior to filing § 2241 petitions.”). This
requirement of exhaustion allows prison officials to develop
a factual record and “an opportunity to resolve
disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities
before being haled into court.” Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).
admits he has not pursued any of his administrative remedies.
See ECF No. 11 at 2. Accordingly, Petitioner's
§ 2241 Petition is subject to summary dismissal for lack
Conclusion and Recommendation
foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district
judge dismiss the Petition in the above-captioned matter