United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division
BRYAN HARWELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
employment case was originally filed in the Court of Common
Pleas for Horry County, South Carolina. Plaintiff Maureen
Dodson ("Dodson") has alleged claims for violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 621, et seq., and violation of the South Carolina
Human Affairs Law ("SCHAL"). Defendant Conway
Hospital, Inc. ("Conway Hospital") removed the case
to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1441, on July 13, 2017.
before the Court is Conway Hospital's [ECF No. 22] motion
for summary judgment. This matter is before the Court with
the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") [ECF No.
54] of Magistrate Judge Thomas E. Rogers, III filed on
January 29, 2019. The Magistrate Judge recommended that
Conway Hospital's motion for summary judgment be granted
and this case dismissed in its entirety. Dodson filed
objections to the Report and Recommendation on February 12,
2019. Conway Hospital filed a Reply on February 25, 2019.
factual background was accurately set forth in the Magistrate
Judge's R&R and neither party has objected to the
R&R's statement of the facts. Accordingly, the Court
adopts and incorporates the R&R's statement of facts
briefly summarize, Dodson began her employment with Conway
Hospital as an occupational therapist/certified hand
therapist in 2009 at the age of 55. On May 7, 2016, Dodson
filed a Charge of Discrimination with the South Carolina
Human Affairs Commission ("SHAC") and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").
Dodson's first charge of discrimination alleged age
discrimination based on the discontinuation of her benefits
and the denial of a promotion from part-time to full-time on
March 21, 2016. SHAC issued a Dismissal and Right to Sue
Notice on July 23, 2016, and the EEOC issued its Dismissal
and Right to Sue Notice on August 24, 2016. Upon receipt of
the right to sue letter from the EEOC, Dodson had ninety days
within which to file a civil action raising federal
discrimination claims. Dodson did not initiate a civil action
within ninety days of receipt of her Right to Sue Notice.
January 13, 2017, Dodson filed a second Charge of
Discrimination with SHAC and the EEOC alleging age
discrimination and retaliation based on her loss of hours.
Dodson stated in her charge that "[a]bout four or five
months ago the need for Hand Therapy care began to decrease.
Rather than lay off Aaron Hardee, 29, who was most recently
hired and restoring me to additional hours, my patients have
been assigned to Mr. Hardee resulting in a significant loss
of hours to me." [Second Charge of Discrimination, ECF
NO. 55-5]. Dodson received a Right to Sue Notice dated April
filed the present action on May 23, 2017.
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The
responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71
(1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the R & R to which
specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate
Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
right to de novo review may be waived by the failure
to file timely objections. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687
F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The Court need not conduct a
de novo review when a party makes only
“general and conclusory objections that do not direct
the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [M]agistrate's
proposed findings and recommendations.” Id.
Moreover, in the absence of objections to the R & R, the
Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting
the recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,
199 (4th Cir. 1983). However, in the absence of objections,
the Court must “‘satisfy itself that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.
2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (2010). “A party
asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of
materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
genuine issue of any material fact exists, summary judgment
is appropriate. See Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d
1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). The facts and inferences to be
drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. However,
"the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
the moving party has met [its] burden, the nonmoving party
must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere
allegations contained in the pleadings to show that there is
a genuine issue for trial." Baber v. Hospital Corp.
of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The
nonmoving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture,
unsupported speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. See Baber, 977 F.2d
at 875. Rather, the nonmoving party is required to
submit evidence of specific facts by way of affidavits,
depositions, interrogatories, ...