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Marshall v. Dodds

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 27, 2019

Virginia L. Marshall and Todd W. Marshall, Respondents,
v.
Kenneth A. Dodds, M.D., Charleston Nephrology Associates, LLC, Georgia Roane, M.D., and Rheumatology Associates, P.A., Petitioners. Appellate Case No. 2016-001936

          Heard May 1, 2018

          Appeal from Charleston County J. C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

          Robert H. Hood, James Bernard Hood and Deborah Harrison Sheffield, all of Hood Law Firm, of Charleston, Stephen L. Brown, D. Jay Davis, Jr., James E. Scott IV, Perry M Buckner IV, and Russell G. Hines, all of Young Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, all for Petitioners.

          Blake A. Hewitt, of Bluestein Thompson Sullivan, LLC, of Columbia and J. Edward Bell III, of Bell Legal Group, and C. Carter Elliott, Jr., of Elliott & Phelan, both of Georgetown, all for Respondents.

         ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

          HEARN, JUSTICE

         Virginia Marshall and her husband filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Kenneth Dodds (a nephrologist), Dr. Georgia Roane (a rheumatologist), and their respective practices, alleging negligent misdiagnosis against both Dodds and Roane. The circuit court granted Dodds' and Roane's motions for summary judgment, ruling these actions were barred by the statute of repose. The Marshalls appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded the cases for trial. Marshall v. Dodds, 417 S.C. 196, 789 S.E.2d 88 (Ct. App. 2016). We affirm as modified, holding the Marshalls' claims for negligent acts that occurred within the six-year repose period are timely.

         FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         In February 2010, Marshall was diagnosed with Waldenstrom's macroglobulinemia, also known as lymphoplasmacytic lymphoma, a rare type of blood cancer. Before this diagnosis, she was treated by Dodds and Roane, who the Marshalls contend committed malpractice by failing to diagnose her cancer. The Marshalls filed suit against Dodds on February 7, 2011, and against Roane on April 8, 2011. The actions were consolidated for discovery, and both doctors moved for summary judgment, contending the claims were time-barred by the six-year statute of repose.

         A. Treatment by Dodds

         Dodds first evaluated Marshall on July 16, 1999, two days after she was admitted to Roper Hospital for a persistent high fever. During her hospitalization, testing revealed elevated sedimentation rates (a measure of the speed at which red blood cells in a tube of blood fall to the bottom of the tube) and proteinuria (elevated protein levels in the urine). On September 15, 2004, Marshall returned to Dodds for the first time since the 1999 visit, and during this appointment, Dodds reviewed a 24-hour urine test performed a month prior that revealed urine protein levels of 3.5 grams per day. This level of protein established Marshall had proteinuria at that time. Dodds did not order further testing during the September 2004 visit but instead started Marshall on Diovan, which is typically prescribed for hypertension. When Marshall returned to Dodds two months later, she had no complaints, and Dodds ordered no additional testing. Thereafter, on February 9, 2005, Dodds treated Marshall again, ordering a 24-hour urine test which revealed proteinuria, with protein levels of 3.1 grams per day. Despite her protein levels remaining elevated, Dodds did not order further testing. Marshall's final visit to Dodds was on September 5, 2005, where another 24-hour urine test revealed her urine protein levels had increased to 4.2 grams per day. However, Dodds did not administer any further testing. The Marshalls' actions against Dodds are based solely upon Dodds' alleged negligence on and after February 9, 2005. They allege Dodds was negligent in failing to recognize the signs and symptoms of proteinuria and in failing to order proper testing-a urine protein electrophoresis test (UPEP) and a serum protein electrophoresis test (SPEP)-which allegedly would have revealed the type of protein in Marshall's urine was cancerous. Apparently cognizant of the statute of repose, the Marshalls did not allege any negligence for acts that occurred more than six years from when the complaint was filed on February 7, 2011.

         Dodds moved for summary judgment, asserting any alleged negligence first occurred more than six years prior to the Marshalls filing suit. Citing deposition testimony from the Marshalls' own experts, Dodds contended the claims were time-barred. One expert, Barry L. Singer, M.D., a specialist in oncology, testified Marshall likely had blood cancer in 2004, which would have been revealed then if a UPEP or SPEP test had been performed. He further testified that in 2004, Dodds negligently failed to diagnose the cancerous protein in Marshall's urine.

         Another expert retained by the Marshalls, nephrologist Robert G. Luke, M.D., noted in his deposition and pre-suit affidavit the following standard of care for nephrologists:

1. If significant proteinuria is present, the nephrologist must determine the cause, which requires the nephrologist to order proper testing to rule out certain causes, including cancerous protein.
2. If routine tests-such as a 24-hour urine test-have inconsistent results, the nephrologist has a duty to order UPEP and SPEP tests to determine whether the protein is cancerous.

         In his deposition, Luke reviewed Marshall's course of treatment with Dodds spanning four office visits from September 15, 2004, through September 15, 2005. During that time, Marshall took the prescription medication Diovan, as prescribed by Dodds, which should have lowered her protein levels. Despite taking this medication, all her 24-hour urine tests showed proteinuria. As a result, Luke testified that Dodds negligently failed to properly monitor Marshall's response to Diovan because otherwise, he would have realized there was no change in her urine protein levels. Further, Luke opined Dodds was negligent in failing to recognize that the continued proteinuria could constitute cancer and failing to order UPEP and SPEP testing, which would have revealed cancerous protein.

         Luke also opined Dodds was negligent in scheduling a six-month follow-up appointment after Marshall's September 2005 visit when a one-month check-up was warranted. However, Marshall did not go to her follow-up appointment. Luke then testified, "I have said ten times [in this deposition] that during the first two visits, [Dodds] was outside the standard of care without following up for the diagnosis of the proteinuria. The other business about responding to Diovan is a relatively minor element of the whole thing." Additionally, Luke noted, "I said the first two visits were enough information for further studies to be done, and I think that's the main evidence." The "first two visits" referred to by Luke were in September and November of 2004, both over six years before the actions were commenced against Dodds on February 7, 2011. However, Luke opined Dodds should have revisited his diagnosis in February and September of 2005 after Marshall's protein levels remained elevated. These alleged acts of negligence occurred within the repose period.

         The circuit court concluded Dodds' alleged misdiagnoses after February 7, 2005, were a continuation of his previous alleged misdiagnoses and were not distinct acts of negligence that could serve as new trigger points of the statute of repose. The court found the statute of repose applicable to the Marshalls' claims against Dodds began to run prior to February 7, 2005, and therefore, time-barred their claims.

         B. Treatment by Roane

         Dr. Roane began treating Marshall in 2000 and in that year diagnosed Marshall with mixed connective tissue disease (MCTD), a rare autoimmune disease. This diagnosis was based in part upon laboratory studies evincing low complements (the complement system helps the body defend against infection) and the aforementioned elevated sedimentation rates and proteinuria. Roane treated Marshall for MCTD until 2007.

         Beginning in 2000, Roane prescribed a drug named Imuran and increased the dosage in April 2001 and again in February 2002. During the time Marshall took Imuran, there were no changes in her sedimentation rates or proteinuria, but the complement levels improved. In August 2003, Roane stopped prescribing Imuran and prescribed CellCept. During the 2002-2003 time frame, Roane ordered no testing other than 24-hour urine tests and the same lab studies. On April 29, 2005, Marshall visited Roane with symptoms including elevated sedimentation rates, enlarged lymph nodes, proteinuria, fever, and chills. Five months later, on September 29, 2005, Roane ordered another 24-hour urine test which revealed Marshall's proteinuria had increased from 3.5 grams per day to 4.2 grams per day over the prior year. However, despite this increase in protein levels when the opposite should have occurred if Marshall actually suffered from MCTD, Roane did not order further testing. Thereafter, Marshall returned to Roane in 2006 and ceased treatment a year later. The Marshalls claim Roane negligently misdiagnosed her cancer as MCTD and negligently failed to order additional testing after the proteinuria was still present at the September 29, 2005 office visit. The Marshalls did not commence their actions against Roane until April 8, 2011, and accordingly, the claims against Roane are only based on conduct that occurred within six years.

         To pursue their claims against Roane, the Marshalls retained Thomas M. Zizic, M.D., an expert in the field of rheumatology. In his deposition, Zizic was particularly critical of Roane's failure to reassess Marshall's condition beginning in 2002 and 2003, especially since her proteinuria, high sedimentation rate, and low complements had not changed even with an increased dosage of Imuran. Specifically, he testified, "I'm very critical at '03. I'm critical at the point where she goes to maximal Imuran in February of '02, 150 milligrams, and still things don't change in terms of the laboratory parameters we've been talking about." Zizic further testified that when the maximal dosage of Imuran was being administered in 2002 and "it still hasn't changed, then at that point you've got to re-workup the patient." Zizic testified this "re-workup" would consist of almost a dozen tests comprising a "complete antibody profile," as well as the aforementioned UPEP and SPEP tests, which if administered in 2003 would have revealed Marshall was not suffering from MCTD.

         Additionally, Zizic testified that Roane breached the standard of care as far back as 2002 and 2003 by not engaging in a "reconsideration of where [Roane] was in the treatment of the patient" and that if the "re-workup" had been done in August 2003, Marshall's blood cancer would have been discovered. Finally, Zizic testified that from 2004 until treatment ended in 2007, Roane should have administered yearly laboratory studies until reaching a definitive diagnosis of Marshall's blood cancer. While Zizic was critical of acts prior to 2005, the failure to administer these tests constituted alleged negligence within six years from when the Marshalls commenced their actions against Roane on April 8, 2011.

         The Marshalls focus solely upon the negligent conduct of Roane occurring on and after April 29, 2005, contending separate repose periods were triggered by each misdiagnosis when the standard of care required Roane to reconsider the original diagnosis. The circuit court disagreed, concluding the sole trigger date of the six-year statute of repose was prior to April 8, 2005, and because the actions against Roane were not commenced until April 8, 2011, the claims were time-barred.

         C. Court of Appeals' Decision

         The Marshalls appealed both rulings, and the court of appeals reversed, holding even though there was evidence Dodds and Roane negligently misdiagnosed Marshall's condition before February 7, 2005, and April 8, 2005, respectively, a new statute of repose period was triggered by each subsequent misdiagnosis because each act was a separate occurrence of negligence. Marshall, 417 S.C. at 205, 789 S.E.2d at 92. We granted Dodds' and Roane's petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.

         ISSUE

         In a medical malpractice case where evidence exists that doctors breached the standard of care on multiple occasions, does the statute of repose begin to run with each breach, resulting in recent breaches being actionable even though older ones are barred?

         STANDARD ...


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