United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
F. Anderson, Jr. Columbia, South Carolina United States
Floyd Edward Williams, #20050057 (“Petitioner”),
a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition
seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (“Petition”). (ECF No. 1). Petitioner is a
federal inmate incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institution Edgefield, in the custody of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”). (ECF No. 23 at 1). After
reviewing the pleadings, the Magistrate Judge assigned to
this action prepared a thorough Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) and recommends that
Respondent Warden Mosley's (“Respondent”)
Motion to Dismiss (which the Court construes as a Motion for
Summary Judgment) (ECF No. 16) be granted and that the
Petition (ECF No. 1) be denied. (ECF No. 23). The Report sets
forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on
this matter. (ECF No. 23 at 1-4).
Report was filed by the Magistrate Judge on August 30, 2018
and Petitioner was advised of his right to file objections to
that Report. (ECF No. 23 at 8). The Magistrate Judge required
Petitioner to file objections to the Report by September 13,
2018. (ECF No. 23 at 8). Petitioner filed his objections on
September 19, 2018, and the Court accepted his technically
late filing pursuant to the prisoner mailbox
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
30, 1999, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina sentenced Petitioner to 140 months
of incarceration and five years of supervised release for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base.
(ECF No. 16-5). On August 1, 2008, Petitioner was released
from incarceration and began the supervised release portion
of his sentence. (ECF No. 16 at 5). On February 16, 2012,
Petitioner was sentenced to 90 months for distribution of
cocaine base. (ECF No. 16-1). On March 12, 2012,
Petitioner's supervised release was revoked, and he was
sentenced to 40 months of incarceration. (ECF No. 16-2).
granted the Director of the BOP discretion to grant early
release to inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses who
successfully complete a residential drug treatment program.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). On March 16,
2009, the BOP promulgated Program Statement 5331.02, Early
Release Procedures Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). (ECF No.
16-4). Under this program statement, an inmate is not
eligible for early release if he has a prior listed felony or
misdemeanor conviction within ten years from the date of
sentencing for his current confinement. (ECF No. 16-4).
October 18, 2016, a request for offense review was conducted
and the BOP determined that, due to a 1995 North Carolina
conviction, Petitioner was not eligible for early release
upon completion of the residential drug abuse program. (ECF
No. 16-3 at 3, 7). On December 1, 2016, Petitioner requested
a re-review of his early release status and the BOP's
Designations and Sentence Computation Center determined the
original review conducted on October 18, 2016, was correct.
(ECF No. 16-3 at 3).
filed this Petition alleging the BOP misinterpreted its
policies and regulations, preventing him from attaining the
benefit of completing the BOP's drug treatment program.
(ECF No. 1 at 6). Petitioner asks the Court to order the BOP
to grant his request to receive a reduction in his sentence.
(ECF No. 1 at 7).
Standard for Review of Magistrate Judge's
district court is required to conduct a de novo
review only of the specific portions of the Magistrate
Judge's Report to which objections are made. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see also
Carniewski v. W.Va. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d
1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections
to portions of the Report, the Court is not required to give
an explanation for adopting the Report. See Camby v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the
Court must only review those portions of the Report to which
Plaintiff has made specific written objections. Diamond
v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316
(4th Cir. 2005).
objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge
to focus attention on those issues- factual and legal-that
are at the heart of the parties' dispute.'”
Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No.
0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec.
12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121
E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A
specific objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report thus
requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the
Complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See
Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL
4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection
must “direct the court to a specific error in the
magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would
a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No.
9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007)
(citing Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Court
reviews portions “not objected to-including those
portions to which only ‘general and conclusory'
objections have been made-for clear ...