United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN
F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
case is before the court for a report and recommendation
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) (D.S.C.),
concerning the disposition of Social Security cases in this
District, and Title 28, United States Code, Section
636(b)(1)(B).[1]
The
plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Section 1631(c)(3)
of the Social Security Act, as amended (42 U.S.C.
1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for
supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act.
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
The
plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security
income (“SSI”) benefits on April 15, 2014,
alleging disability commencing August 24, 2007. The
application was denied initially and on reconsideration by
the Social Security Administration. On June 23, 2015, the
plaintiff requested a hearing. The administrative law judge
(“ALJ”), before whom the plaintiff and J. Adger
Brown, Jr., an impartial vocational expert, appeared during a
hearing on February 16, 2017, considered the case de
novo, and on June 13, 2017, found that the plaintiff was
not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act,
as amended (Tr. 7-26). The ALJ's finding became the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the
Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request for review
on March 20, 2018 (Tr. 1-5). The plaintiff then filed this
action for judicial review.
In
making the determination that the plaintiff is not entitled
to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following
findings of the ALJ:
(1) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since April 15, 2014, the application date (20
C.F.R. § 416.971 et. seq.)
(2) The claimant has the following severe impairments:
schizophrenia, paranoid type; depressive disorder NOS; and
history of substance abuse (20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)).
(3) The claimant does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals the the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§
416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
(4) After careful consideration of the entire record, I find
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but
with the following nonexertional limitations: He is limited
to unskilled work defined as performing simple, routine
and/or repetitive tasks in 2-hour increments with customary
breaks to complete an 8-hour workday. He is further limited
to no work activity interaction with the public and no
team-type interaction with coworkers; non-work activity
incidental contact is allowed.
(5) The claimant has no past relevant work (20 C.F.R. §
416.965).
(6) The claimant was born on July 5, 1971, and was 42 years
old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on
the date the application was filed (20 C.F.R. §
416.963).
(7) The claimant has a limited education and is able to
communicate in English (20 C.F.R. § 416.964).
(8) Transferability of job skills is not material to the
determination of disability because using the
Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding
that the claimant is “not disabled, ” whether or
not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41
and 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
(9) Considering the claimant's age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs
in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20
C.F.R. § 416.969, 416.969(a)).
(10) The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined
in the Social Security Act, since April 15, 2014, the date
the application was filed (20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)).
The
only issues before the court are whether proper legal
standards were applied and whether the final decision of the
Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.
APPLICABLE
LAW
Under
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A), (H)(i), as well as pursuant
to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is
defined as an “inability to do any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.905(a).
To
facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability
claims, the Social Security Act has by regulation reduced the
statutory definition of “disability” to a series
of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider
whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment
that meets or medically equals an impairment contained in the
Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1, (4) can perform his past relevant work, and (5) can
perform other work. Id. § 416.920. If an
individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry
is unnecessary. Id. § 416.920(a)(4).
A
claimant must make a prima facie case of disability
by showing he is unable to return to his past relevant work
because of his impairments. Grant v. Schweiker, 699
F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983). Once an individual
has established a prima facie case of disability,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the
plaintiff can perform alternative work and that such work
exists in the national economy. Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). The Commissioner may carry this
burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert.
Id. at 192.
Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the
Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review
is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's
findings “are supported by substantial evidence and
were reached through application of the correct legal
standard.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589
(4th Cir. 1996). “Substantial evidence” means
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of
more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat
less than a preponderance.” Id. In reviewing
the evidence, the court may not “undertake to re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or
substitute [its] judgment for that of the
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