United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
ORDER
Joseph
F. Anderson, Jr. United States District Judge.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Robert
Salley, (“Plaintiff”), brings this action raising
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Paul
Myers (“Defendant”). This case arises out of
Plaintiff's arrest on January 15, 2014. On August 23,
2018, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No.
24). On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff, through counsel,
responded. (ECF No. 26). On September 13, 2018, Defendant
replied to Plaintiff's response. (ECF No. 27). In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule
73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the case was referred to the
Magistrate Judge.
The
Magistrate Judge assigned to this action[1] prepared a
thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”) and
opines that this Court should grant Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment because Plaintiff fails to show he can
put forth evidence to meet all the elements of malicious
prosecution. (ECF No. 28). The Report sets forth, in detail,
the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and
this Court incorporates those facts and standards without a
recitation.
The
Court is charged with making a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report to which specific objections
are made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge,
or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
However, a district court is only required to conduct a
de novo review of the specific portions of the
Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b);
Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific
objections to portions of the Report of the Magistrate, this
Court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the
recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,
199 (4th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff
was advised of his right to object to the Report, which was
entered on the docket on December 4, 2018. (ECF No. 29).
Plaintiff, through counsel, filed objections to the Report
(“Objections”) on December 5, 2018. (ECF No. 23).
On December 19, 2018, Defendant filed a Reply to
Plaintiff's Objections. (ECF No. 32). On January 3, 2019,
Plaintiff filed a supplement to his Objections and Response
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 35). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The
Report recites the factual and procedural background giving
rise to this action. Briefly, Defendant arrested Plaintiff on
January 15, 2014, for violating City of Columbia Code §
22-72, “Congregating on streets and sidewalks.”
The events leading up to Plaintiff's arrest are disputed.
According
to Plaintiff, on January 15, 2014, he was walking toward a
bus stop located at the corner of Sumter Street and Laurel
Street to catch a bus. Plaintiff asserts as he was walking
along Sumter Street, Defendant and another City of Columbia
police officer approached him from a parking lot adjacent to
the sidewalk and told him he was blocking the sidewalk.
Plaintiff thought the officers were kidding and tried to walk
between them, but the officers grabbed him. Plaintiff claims
he asked the officers “What's wrong with
you?” to which Defendant responded that Plaintiff was
“blocking the sidewalk.” Plaintiff claims he
pointed out a man on the sidewalk drinking beer, but
Defendant said “no, I want you.” Plaintiff claims
that Defendant stated twice he was “making a
statement” by arresting Plaintiff. Defendants
handcuffed Plaintiff and searched his person. According to
Plaintiff, he asked the officers what they were doing, and
Defendant asked if Plaintiff was trying to avoid being
arrested and stated “I'm looking for drugs.”
Defendant's
version of events leading up to the arrest is different.
According to Defendant, he observed Plaintiff and another man
standing on the sidewalk in front of the bus station for
seven to ten minutes. Defendant claims “a few
people” had to walk onto Sumter Street to walk around
Plaintiff and the other man. Defendant asserts at the time,
that section of Sumter Street was busy with pedestrians and
buses pulling up to the sidewalk. Defendant claims he
approached Plaintiff and the man Plaintiff was speaking with
walked away. Defendant testified he asked Plaintiff to move
and explained he needed him to do so because he was blocking
the sidewalk for pedestrians. Defendant claims he tried to
explain to Plaintiff his objective was to make Plaintiff
move, but Plaintiff became very hostile, confrontational, and
even called Defendant a “white piece of
[expletive].” Defendant claims he handcuffed Plaintiff
to effect an arrest because Plaintiff refused to move.
According to Defendant, he patted Plaintiff down for weapons
because of Plaintiff's demonstrated hostility toward
Defendant and Plaintiff continued yelling after he was
handcuffed. Defendant claims he did not search Plaintiff for
drugs.
After
Defendant uncuffed plaintiff, he issued him a uniform traffic
citation for violating City of Columbia Code § 22-72,
“Congregating on streets and sidewalks.” The
citation summoned Plaintiff to the municipal court, providing
an appearance date of January 17, 2014. However, Plaintiff
immediately went to the municipal court following his arrest
and filled out a jury trial request form. Plaintiff was
summoned to appear at a roster meeting on July 25, 2017,
where he again demanded a jury trial, which was set for
August 7, 2017. When Plaintiff appeared for his trial,
Plaintiff and Defendant spoke. Plaintiff claims Defendant
said he arrested Plaintiff because he thought he “had
drugs, ” and then dropped the charges.
According
to Defendant, he decided not to prosecute Plaintiff because
he wanted to “cut him a break” due to
Plaintiff's age and the length of time that had passed
since the arrest. Defendant testified that Plaintiff
indicated the nolle prosequi was fine with him.
Defendant gave Plaintiff a “Letter of
Disposition” indicating the municipal charge was
nolle prossed.
On
November 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant
in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas asserting claims
of claims of false arrest and imprisonment and malicious
prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thereafter,
Defendant removed this case to federal court and moved for
summary judgment.
III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary
judgment should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of
proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the movant
makes the showing, however, the opposing party must respond
to the motion with “specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56).
When no
genuine issue of any material fact exists, summary judgment
is appropriate. See Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d
1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the facts and inferences to be drawn from the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id. However, “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
...