United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Robert Holland Koon, #227826, a/k/a Robert Koon, a/k/a Robert H Koon, Plaintiff,
Timothy Clark, Jordan Williams, S.C.D.C., Nurse Lynce, Defendants.
E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
a civil action filed by a state prisoner. On October 15,
2018, a scheduling order was issued with Motions to Amend
Pleadings due by November 15, 2018. (ECF No. 54). On October
18, 2018, Plaintiff moved to amend. (ECF No. 59). On November
1, 2018, the Motion was granted. (ECF No. 77). Plaintiff did
not file an Amended Complaint. On January 2, 2019, Plaintiff
filed a second Motion to Amend. (ECF No. 109). Plaintiff was
ordered to file one complete amended complaint by February 1,
2019. The court ordered Plaintiff:
Because Plaintiff has made several piecemeal filings,
Plaintiff is ordered to file one complete Amended Complaint
within twenty days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is
advised that an amended complaint will supercede the previous
original complaint and it must be complete in itself without
reference to the prior pleading. Therefore, in an amended
complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the
involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled
“Amended Complaint, ” refer to the appropriate
case number, and be an original signed under penalty of
perjury. Plaintiff is reminded that an amended complaint
replaces the original complaint and should be complete in
itself. See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d
567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, an
amended pleading ordinarily supercedes the original and
renders it of no legal effect.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 6 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (3d ed.
2017) (“A pleading that has been amended under Rule
15(a) supercedes the pleading it modifies and remains in
effect throughout the action unless it subsequently is
modified. Once an amended pleading is interposed, the
original pleading no longer performs any function in the
case. . .”).
Therefore, Plaintiff's motions (ECF Nos. 43, 59, 70, 71
and 109) are granted in part and denied in part. If Plaintiff
does not file one complete Amended Complaint as ordered in
compliance with the directions above, within the applicable
time period, the motions (ECF Nos. 43, 59, 70, 71 and 109)
will be denied and the Original Complaint will be considered
as the only active complaint.
(ECF No. 115). On February 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 131). On
February 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a proposed amended
court has stated well the standard applicable here:
Once a scheduling order's deadline for amendment
of pleadings has passed, a movant must first demonstrate to
the court that it has a “good cause” for seeking
modification of the scheduling deadline under Rule
16(b). If the movant satisfies Rule 16(b)'s
“good cause” standard, it must then pass the
requirements for amendment under Rule 15(a). Smith v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 902 F.Supp. 719, 720
(S.D.W.V.1995); Marcum v. Zimmer, 163 F.R.D. 250-254
(S.D.W.V.1995); Forstmann v. Culp, 114 F.R.D. 83,
85-86 (M.D. N.C. 1987); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,
Inc., 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1992).
Rule 16 was drafted to prevent parties from disregarding the
agreed-upon course of litigation. The Rule assures the court
and the parties that “at some point both the parties
and the pleadings will be fixed.” Advis. Comm. Notes
for 1983 Amend. Consistent with the Rule's intent, this
court has admonished litigants that “[a] scheduling
order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which
can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without
peril.” Jordan v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 867
F.Supp. 1238, 1250 (D.S.C.1994) (citing Johnson, 975
F.2d at 610).
Rule 16(b)'s “good cause” standard is much
different than the more lenient standard contained in Rule
15(a). Rule 16(b) does not focus on the bad faith of the
movant, or the prejudice to the opposing party. Rather, it
focuses on the diligence of the party seeking leave to modify
the scheduling order to permit the proposed amendment.
Smith, 902 F.Supp. at 720; Marcum, 163
F.R.D. at 254; Forstmann, 114 F.R.D. at 85;
Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Properly construed,
“good cause” means that scheduling deadlines
cannot be met despite a party's diligent efforts. 6A
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed. 1990). In
other words, this court may “modify the schedule on a
showing of good cause if [the deadline] cannot be met despite
the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”
Advis. Comm. Notes for 1983 Amend.; Forstmann, 114
F.R.D. at 85. Carelessness is not compatible with a finding
of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.
Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.
Dilmar Oil Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 986
F.Supp. 959, 980 (D.S.C.), aff'd sub nom., 129
F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1997)(emphasis added).
accordance with the above case law, Plaintiff is ordered to
demonstrate good cause as required by Rule 16(b) by filing
written explanation with the court within fifteen (15) days
of the date of this order.