United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division
Marcus D. Kelly, Plaintiff,
BRYAN HARWELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court for review of the Report and
Recommendation (“R & R”) of United States
Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West, who recommends granting
Defendant's motion to dismiss and dismissing
Plaintiff's pro se amended complaint. See ECF
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with
this Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,
270-71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the R & R to which
specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
party has filed objections to the R & R, and the time for
doing so has expired. In the absence of objections to the R
& R, the Court is not required to give any explanation
for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendations.
See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir.
1983). The Court reviews only for clear error in the absence
of an objection. See Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005)
(stating that “in the absence of a timely filed
objection, a district court need not conduct de novo review,
but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory
reviewed the record for clear error, the Court
ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's R & R
[ECF No. 60] except as modified by Footnote 2
below. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss
[ECF No. 53], DISMISSES Plaintiff's
amended complaint with prejudice,  and
DIRECTS the Clerk to close this case.
IS SO ORDERED.
 The Magistrate Judge issued the R
& R in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local
Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). The Court is mindful of its
duty to liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants
such as Plaintiff. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). But see Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)
(“Principles requiring generous construction of pro se
complaints are not, however, without limits. Gordon
directs district courts to construe pro se complaints
liberally. It does not require those courts to conjure up
questions never squarely presented to them.”).
 Plaintiff's objections were due by
January 31, 2019. See ECF Nos. 60 & 61.
 The Court respectfully disagrees with
the Magistrate Judge's recommendation regarding the
timeliness of Plaintiff's amended complaint. See
R & R at pp. 9-10. On July 25, 2018, the Court entered a
text order extending the time for Plaintiff to file any
amended complaint to August 9, 2018, and stating “[n]o
further extensions will be granted.” ECF No. 49.
However, as Defendant correctly points out, Plaintiff (a
non-prisoner) did not file his amended complaint until August
13, 2018, and therefore failed to comply with the Court's
July 25 text order. “A paper is filed when it is
delivered to the Clerk (or a judge), not when it is mailed.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(2).” Cleveland v.
South Carolina, No. 4:17-cv-02138-RBH, 2017 WL 4021082,
at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2017); see Bacon v. Stiefel
Labs., Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1189 n.1 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (explaining Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) is inapplicable
“[w]hen the Court orders action by a certain
date”). Accordingly, the Court would alternatively
dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
41(b) for failure to comply with a court order.
 The Court previously gave Plaintiff an
opportunity to file an amended complaint (which he did), and
Defendant then filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). As thoroughly explained in the R
& R, the amended complaint still fails to state a
plausible claim, and therefore the Court in its discretion is
dismissing with prejudice. See Adbul-Mumit v. Alexandria
Hyundai, LLC, 896 F.3d 278, 292 (4th Cir. 2018)
(“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is with prejudice
unless it specifically orders dismissal without prejudice.
That determination is within the district court's
discretion.” (brackets, ellipsis, and italics
omitted)); Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724
Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (indicating that because
“the district court already . . . afforded Workman the
opportunity to amend, ” it could “dismiss the