United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
ORDER AND OPINION
Richard Mark Gergel United States District Court Judge
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
("R & R") of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 37)
recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 22), and remand the
remaining state law claim. Plaintiff filed objections. (Dkt.
No. 38.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts
the R & R, and grants in part and denies in part
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and remands the
remaining state law claim.
27, 2014, Julie Welch, who was previously in a relationship
with Plaintiff Carly Ryals, called the Hanahan Police
Department and requested a no trespass notice. (Dkt. No. 32
at ¶ 9.) Officer Ronnie Scheetz advised Plaintiff over
the phone not to contact Welch and that he was being placed
on notice. (Dkt. No. 22-9 at 3.) On June 5, 2014, Officer
Travis Dodd met with Welch who stated that Plaintiff was
still repeatedly contacting her. (Dkt. No. 22-10.) Welch
presented a detailed log of contact between herself and
Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 22-11.) On June 17, 2014, the police
were again called to Welch's house as Plaintiff was on
her property. The police arrived and found Plaintiff on her
property refusing to leave. (Dkt. 22-15.) Plaintiff was
arrested for trespass after notice, and was served with a
summons for the prior unlawful communication. (Dkt. Nos.
22-12; 22-15.) A judge found there was probable cause of
unlawful communication to support an arrest warrant. (Dkt.
No. 22-14.) Plaintiff was found guilty of unlawful
communication and trespass after notice on September 25,
2014. (Dkt. Nos. 22-3; 22-8.)
15, 2014, a one year restraining order was issued against
Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 22-16.) Police reported to Welch's
residence on both August 24, 2014, and August 30, 2014, in
response to Plaintiffs presence. (Dkt Nos. 22-17 - 22-20.) A
judge found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant for
both incidents. (Id.) Plaintiff was found guilty for
both violations of the restraining order on December 10,
2014, during a hearing at which he was not present. (Dkt. No.
22-8; 32-14.) Defendants allege that Plaintiff refused
transport, Plaintiff alleges that he did not refuse transport
and instead Defendants simply did not transport him. (Dkt.
No. 32-14; 22-5.)
brings an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false
imprisonment. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 72 - 74.) Plaintiff
additionally brings claims under state law for malicious
prosecution and abuse of process for failing to transport
Plaintiff to the court on December 10, 2014. (Id. at
74 - 75.) On June 15, 2018, Defendants brought a motion to
dismiss, or in the alternative a motion for summary judgment
and Plaintiff responded. (Dkt. Nos. 22, 32.) The Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissing Plaintiffs claims under §
1983 and for malicious prosecution, and remanding the
remaining claim to state court. (Dkt. No. 37.) Plaintiff
filed objections. (Dkt. No. 38.)
prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary
judgment has the burden of identifying the portions of the
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, any
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
which show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). The Court will construe all inferences and
ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving
party. US. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962). The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in
support of the non-moving party's position is
insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1986). However, an issue of material fact is genuine if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict in favor of the non-movant. Id. at 257.
the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its
opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "In the language of the Rule,
the nonmoving party must come forward with "specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Id. at 587. "Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for
trial.'" Id. quoting First Nat'l Bank of
Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility for making a final determination remains with
this Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270
- 71 (1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which specific objection is made.
Additionally, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by
the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In
the absence of any specific objections, "a district
court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must
only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face
of the record in order to accept the recommendation."
See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
omitted). Plaintiff filed objections and therefore the R
& R are reviewed de novo.
§ 1983 Claim for ...