United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division
C. Coggins, Jr. United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's Order entered June 18,
2018, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). ECF
No. 64. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of
Court's decision adopting the Report and Recommendation
of the Magistrate Judge and granting Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment. Defendants filed a Response in
Opposition, and Plaintiff filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 65, 66. For
the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to
seek an alteration or amendment of a previous order of the
court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Under Rule 59(e), a court may
"alter or amend the judgment if the movant shows either
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new
evidence that was not available at trial, or (3) that there
has been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice."
Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d
403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Collison v. Int'l
Chem. Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1994).
It is the moving party's burden to establish one of these
three grounds in order to obtain relief. Loren Data Corp.
v. GXS, Inc., 501 Fed.Appx. 275, 285 (4th Cir. 2012).
The decision whether to reconsider an order under Rule 59(e)
is within the sound discretion of the district court.
Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1382 (4th Cir.
1995). A motion to reconsider should not be used as a
"vehicle for rearguing the law, raising new arguments,
or petitioning a court to change its mind." Lyles v.
Reynolds, C/A No. 4:14-1063-TMC, 2016 WL 1427324, at *1
(D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2016) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008)).
Motion, Plaintiff does not make any arguments for
reconsideration referencing either an intervening change in
controlling law or new evidence previously unavailable.
Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff's Motion as
seeking reconsideration on the basis that it would be an
error of law or manifest injustice if the Court failed to
reverse its decision granting Defendants' Motion for
Functions of Job
prior Order, the Court found that Plaintiff's physical
presence at the job site was an essential function of his
position. Here, Plaintiff argues that the Court placed too
much emphasis on a letter Plaintiff wrote to his physician on
September 9, 2014. Plaintiff provides no support for his
conclusion that because the letter was not a primary focus of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court erred
by discussing it in its Order. The Court has reviewed its
analysis and concludes that the decision granting summary
judgment does not result in the commission of either clear
error or manifest injustice.Accordingly, the Motion is denied
with respect to this argument.
also raises, without any citation to legal authority, that
the letter is a privileged communication between Plaintiff
and his physician. The Court disagrees. See Shoemake v.
Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:13-cv-013-RLV-DCK, 2014 WL
683765, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 20, 2014) (citing Butler v.
Burroughs Welcome, Inc., 920 F.Supp. 90, 91 (E.D. N.C.
1996) (granting motion to compel in employment case where
plaintiff resisted disclosing her medical records and refused
to supply defendant with signed authorizations and release
forms)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is denied with
respect to these arguments.
Court determined that Defendants engaged in an interactive
process to find a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff again argues that the Court improperly relied on
the September 9, 2014, letter. The Court finds that its
reliance on this letter does not result in the commission of
either clear error or manifest injustice. Plaintiff also
raises essentially the same arguments raised in his response
to the Motion for Summary Judgment and objections to the
Report and Recommendation with respect to whether Defendant
engaged in a good faith interactive process to identify a
reasonable accommodation and whether the Magistrate Judge
erred in failing to consider extended leave as a reasonable
accommodation. These arguments have already been ruled upon.
Moreover, the Court has reviewed its analysis of these
arguments and concludes that its decision does not result in
the commission of either clear error or manifest injustice.
Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied with
respect to these arguments.
prior Order, the Court found that Defendants established a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Plaintiff's
termination and that Plaintiff failed to establish that the
proffered reason was mere pretext. Here, Plaintiff argues
that the Court focused too much on Defendant's proffered
legitimate non-retaliatory reason for Plaintiff's
termination and, unfortunately, cited to Jiminez v. Mary
Washington College, 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995),
when it should have cited to Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). The Court notes
that the Fourth Circuit has cited to the same language from
Jiminez as recently as 2017. See Lovett v.
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 700 Fed.Appx.
209, 212 (4th Cir. 2017) (relying on Jiminez, 57
F.3d at 378); Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787
F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015) (“In meeting this
ultimate burden, the plaintiff must show ‘both that the