Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Allen v. Holiday Kamper Company of Columbia, LLC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division

October 25, 2018

JEFFREY E. ALLEN and ELIZABETH A ALLEN, Plaintiffs
v.
HOLIDAY KAMPER COMPANY OF COLUMBIA, LLC d/b/a Camping World RV Sales; WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES, INC.; and BANK OF AMERICA, NA, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND

          MARY GEIGER LEWIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         I. INTRODUCTION

         Plaintiffs Jeffery E. Allen and Elizabeth A. Allen (collectively, the Allens) brought this suit in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County against Defendants Holiday Kamper Company of Columbia, LLC, d/b/a Camping World RV Sales (Camping World), Winnebago Industries, Inc. (Winnebago), and Bank of America, NA (Bank of America) (collectively, Defendants). The Allens claim breaches of warranties under state law and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Warranty Act), breaches of the South Carolina Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act, Lemon Law liability, rescission, and revocation of acceptance. Defendants subsequently removed the case to this Court.

         Pending before the Court is the Allen's motion to remand. Having carefully considered the motion, the response, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will deny the motion.

         II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         The Allens purchased the subject recreational vehicle (RV or camper) from Camping World. The RV was manufactured by Winnebago. They paid $125, 000 for the RV, plus $4, 075 in additional charges, for a total of $129, 075.00. The Allens financed $90, 075 of this amount. The loan was assigned to Bank of America.

         According to the Allens, “[s]hortly after purchasing the camper, [they] experienced numerous unrelenting problems . . . . [They] have had the camper in for repairs at the Camping World Repair Shop on numerous occasions, totaling many months.” Complaint ¶ 7-8.

         After the Allens filed suit in state court, Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of the Allen's Warranty Act claim. The Allens then filed their motion to remand, to which Defendants filed a response. The Court, having been briefed on the relevant issues, is now prepared to adjudicate the motion on the merits.

         III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         The plaintiff is the master of the complaint and may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusively relying upon state law. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Nevertheless, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

         “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is placed upon the party seeking removal.” Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). The Court is “obliged to construe removal jurisdiction strictly because of the ‘significant federalism concerns' implicated.” Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). “Therefore, ‘[i]f federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand [to state court] is necessary.'” Id. (quoting Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). Moreover, any ambiguity is to be construed against the removing party. Her Majesty The Queen In Right of the Province of Ont. v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 1989).

         When considering a motion to remand, the Court accepts as true all relevant allegations contained in the complaint and construes all factual ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1163-64 (5th Cir. 1988). The “well-pleaded complaint rule” requires the exercise of federal jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F.3d 444, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004)).

         The Court “has jurisdiction over an entire action, including state-law claims, whenever the federal-law claims and state-law claims in the case ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact' and are ‘such that [a plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.'” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).

         IV. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.