United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
Chelsea D. Boykin, Plaintiff,
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; Timothy J. Sloan; Stephen W. Sanger; Elizabeth A. Duke; John D. Baker, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
plaintiff, Chelsea D. Boykin, proceeding pro se,
brings this action alleging violations of federal employment
laws. The Complaint has been filed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil
Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Complaint in
accordance with applicable law, the court concludes the
individual defendants-Timothy J. Sloan, Stephen W. Sanger,
Elizabeth A. Duke, and John D. Baker-should be summarily
dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of
Factual and Procedural Background
indicates that she was terminated from her job at Wells Fargo
Bank without notice while she was on short-term disability
leave for her post-traumatic stress disorder. (Compl., ECF
No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff raises claims pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101, et seq.; and the Equal Pay Act
of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). (Id. at 3-4.)
Standard of Review
established local procedure in this judicial district, a
careful review has been made of the pro se
Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence
an action in federal court without prepaying the
administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This
statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a
finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,
” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible
on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need
only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations,
not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
court is required to liberally construe pro se
complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d
206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of
liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore
a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set
forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684
(outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil
court finds Plaintiff's claims against the individually
named defendants should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). As to Plaintiff's claims
pursuant to Title VII and the ADA, these statutes do not
provide for individual liability. See Lissau v. S. Food
Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that there is no individual liability under Title VII);
Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir.
1999) (holding that individual supervisors are not subject to
liability under the ADA); see also Jones v.
Sternheimer, 387 Fed.Appx. 366 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding
that Title VII and the ADA do not provide for causes of
action against individuals). Thus, Plaintiff's Title VII
and ADA claims against the individually named defendants, who
appear to be officials at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2), fail as a matter of
while individual liability claims may be permissible under
the Equal Pay Act, see Brock v. Hamad, 867 F.2d 804,
808 n.6 (4th Cir. 1989), Plaintiff fails to allege any facts
about the individually named defendants, or even allege that
she was paid differently than others. See Jones, 387
Fed.Appx. at n.* (affirming the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim against
the individually named defendants because the plaintiff
“entirely fails to allege any form of gender
discrimination”). Therefore, the individual defendants
should be dismissed from this action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
the court recommends that the Complaint be summarily
dismissed against Timothy J. Sloan, Stephen W. Sanger,
Elizabeth A. Duke, and John D. Baker without ...