Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Brown v. United States

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division

June 19, 2018

Norris Juandron Brown, Petitioner,
v.
United States of America, Respondent.

          ORDER

          R. BRYAN HARWELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's pro se [ECF No. 821] motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his plea agreement. Petitioner argues he received a longer sentence than he should have as a result of his attorney's alleged ineffectiveness.

         On July 10, 2017, the government filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Petitioner's motion is untimely. On July 10, 2017, a Roseboro Order was issued advising Petitioner that a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment had been filed and that his failure to respond could result in the dismissal of his case. See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1975). Petitioner filed a pro se response to the government's motion. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Respondent's motion for summary judgment, dismisses Petitioner's motion to vacate, and dismisses this case with prejudice.[1]

         Procedural History

         On June 17, 2014, Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution of 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement provided for a stipulated sentence of 140 months imprisonment. The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) prepared by the U.S. Probation Office determined that Petitioner's sentencing guideline range was 262 to 327 months in prison based on a total offense level of 34 and criminal history category of VI.

         On November 18, 2014, the Court accepted the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and sentenced Petitioner to 140 months imprisonment. The judgment was entered on November 19, 2014. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence. The deadline for Petitioner to file a notice of appeal from his conviction and sentence was December 3, 2014, 14 days after the judgment was entered.

         Petitioner filed the instant motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on June 22, 2017, the date Petitioner delivered his motion to the prison mail room.

         Applicable Law

         Prisoners in federal custody may attack the validity of their sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In order to move the court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under § 2255, a petitioner must prove that one of the following occurred: (1) a sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ‘will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.' (internal citation omitted) For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. (internal citations omitted) Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only if the alleged error constituted ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice'”. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, n. 10 (1976); see also United States v. Boyd, No. 02-6242, 2002 WL 1932522, at *1 (4th Cir Aug. 22, 2002) (“Non-constitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal . . . may not be raised in a collateral proceeding under § 2255.”).

         Discussion

         The government argues that Petitioner's motion to vacate is untimely and must be dismissed. The Court agrees.

         The enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) amended § 2255 by imposing a one-year statute of limitations period for the filing of any motion under this Section. Accordingly, the one-year period of limitation begins to run from the latest of the following four dates:

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.