United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Robert H. Rivernider, Jr., Petitioner,
Hector Joyner, Warden, Respondent.
Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court upon Petitioner Robert H.
Rivernider, Jr.'s pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with
28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c)
(D.S.C.), the matter was referred to a United States
Magistrate Judge for initial review. On January 17, 2018,
Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant issued a report and
recommendation (“Report”), analyzing the issues
and recommending that the Court grant Respondent's motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment and dismiss this action
with prejudice. After being granted an extension of time,
Petitioner filed objections to the Report, and the matter is
ripe for review.
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The
Court is charged with making a de novo determination only of
those portions of the Report to which a specific objection is
made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, or
recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of
specific objections, the Court reviews the matter only for
clear error. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating
that “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a
district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead
must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error
on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.'”) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72
advisory committee's note).
was sentenced on December 18, 2013, in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut to 144 months
of imprisonment with 5 years of supervision for conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and wire fraud. According to the parties,
Petitioner was arrested on November 5, 2010, and he was
released on a $100, 000.00 non-surety bond on March 18, 2011.
In addition to a No. of special conditions of bond,
Petitioner was placed on computer/internet restrictions and
home detention with electronic monitoring. Petitioner was
sentenced on December 18, 2013, and was ordered to
self-surrender to a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
facility, which he did on January 29, 2014. According to the
BOP's sentence computation, Petitioner's sentence
commenced on January 29, 2014, with prior custody credit from
the date of his arrest (November 5, 2010) through the date he
was released on bond (March 18, 2011).
action, Petitioner seeks credit for the time spent while
released on bond under supervised home confinement until he
was sentenced. Petitioner argues that the BOP's
failure to give him credit for this time is unconstitutional
and violates his due process rights. He also alleges that the
restrictions placed on him were punitive in nature and that
he is therefore entitled to credit for this time period.
Magistrate Judge noted in his Report, the computation of a
federal sentence is the responsibility of the Attorney
General of the United States and has been delegated to the
BOP. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331
(1992); 28 C.F.R. § 0.96. The computation of a federal
sentence encompasses two separate issues: the commencement
date of the federal sentence and whether a prisoner is
entitled to receive credit for time spent in pre-trial
custody prior to the commencement of the federal sentence. As
to the second issue: “A defendant shall be given credit
towards the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he
has spent in official detention prior to the date the
sentence commences.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585 (emphasis
Magistrate Judge also noted, pursuant to Program Statement
5880.28 of the Sentence Computation Manual (CCCA of 1984),
which the BOP promulgated to provide guidance on the
application of federal statutes in federal sentence
computations, time spent participating in an electronic
monitoring program as a condition of bond is not considered
“official detention.” In addition, the United
States Supreme Court has rejected the premise that the
restrictiveness of conditions of confinement may constitute
detention, finding that “[a] defendant who is
‘released' is not in BOP's custody, and he
cannot be summarily reassigned to a different place of
confinement unless a judicial officer revokes his
release.” Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 63
(1995). The Fourth Circuit also has held that “[f]or
purpose of calculating credit for time served under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585, ‘official detention' means
imprisonment in a place of confinement, not stipulations
imposed upon a person not subject to full physical
incarceration.” United States v. Insley, 927
F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 655 (10 th Cir. 1989)); see also
United States v. Prine, 167 Fed.Appx. 962, 962 (4th
Cir. 2006) (finding that “time spent on home
confinement with electronic monitoring does not constitute
time served in ‘official detention' under 18 U.S.C.
on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge determined that
Petitioner is not entitled to credit for time spent under
monitoring when he was released on bond.
objections, Petitioner merely rehashes his claims and asserts
that the conditions placed on him while on bond were solely
for the purpose of punishment. In support he cites United
States v. Lominac; however, Lominac has no bearing on
this case as it involved the constitutionality of a sentence
imposed for violation of supervised release. 144 F.3d 308
(4th Cir. 1998). Although the Fourth Circuit remarked that
“supervised release is punishment, ” this case
does not involve any question related to a sentence of
supervised release. Id.
review of Petitioner's objections, the Court finds them
wholly without merit and agrees with the Magistrate Judge
that Petitioner has not shown that any restrictive conditions
imposed on bond were solely for the purpose of punishment
rather than to monitor his activity and protect the safety of
the community, as well as to ensure Petitioner's
appearance at necessary court proceedings. In addition,
although Petitioner raises additional conclusory allegations
of prosecutorial misconduct and deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs, as the Court previously noted,
Petitioner cannot seek relief for these claims in this §
2241 petition, and these claims are subject to dismissal.
Ultimately, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge
appropriately summarized the facts and the applicable
principles of law, and the Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge that Petitioner has failed to show that he is entitled
to credit for the time he spent under monitoring on bond.
it is hereby ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report
(ECF No. 18) is adopted and incorporated herein;
Respondent's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment
(ECF No. ...