United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
Nancy C. Perez, Plaintiff,
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation and Director Holly Gillespie Pisarik, in her official and personal capacities, Defendants.
F. ANDERSON, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
C. Perez (Plaintiff) brings this action pro se against South
Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation and
Director Holly Gillespie Pisarik, in her official and
personal capacities (Defendants). Plaintiff's Complaint
asks the Court to compel Defendants to allow her to practice
as a nurse in South Carolina and to provide her with back pay
from July 2014 to present. The South Carolina Department of
Labor, Licensing and Regulation (SCDLLR) has temporarily
denied her license due to an unexplained discrepancy between
Plaintiff's application and her background
check.After Plaintiff was unsuccessful in state
court, she brought this nearly identical action in federal
court on November 27, 2017. Defendants filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings on January 11, 2018. (ECF No. 26).
Plaintiff responded on January 12, 2018. (ECF No. 29).
Defendants filed a reply on January 17, 2018. (ECF No. 31).
Plaintiff proceeded to file three amended responses and
Defendants' subsequently filed a reply to each of those.
reviewing the pleadings, the Magistrate Judge assigned to
this actionprepared a thorough Report and
Recommendation (Report) and opines that Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 26) should be
granted. The Magistrate found that Plaintiff failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted for a violation of
her right to due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Magistrate further found that Plaintiff's motion for
a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF
No. 17) should be denied as moot. The Report sets forth, in
detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this
matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards
without a recitation.
filed objections to the Report on March 28, 2018. (ECF No.
50). Defendants filed a reply to the objections on March 30,
2018. (ECF No. 51). Plaintiff filed amended objections on
April 5, 2018. (ECF No. 52). Defendants filed a reply to
Plaintiff's amended objections on April 18, 2018. (ECF
No. 53). Plaintiff then filed a motion to amend her
objections with the amended objections attached. (ECF No.
54). The Court grants Plaintiff's motion to amend, and
therefore, considers Plaintiff's Second Amended
Objections to the Report as Plaintiff's objections.
Court is charged with making a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report to which specific objections
are made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge,
or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the
absence of specific objections to portions of the Report,
this Court is not required to give an explanation for
adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718
F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge
to focus attention on those issues-factual and legal-that are
at the heart of the parties' dispute.'”
Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No.
0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec.
12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121
E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A
specific objection to the Magistrate's Report thus
requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the
Complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See
Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL
4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). “[G]eneral and
conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a
specific error in the Magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations” are not specific objections and do not
warrant de novo review. Orpiano v. Johnson,
687 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1982).
asserts several objections to the Report. The Court does its
best to decipher Plaintiff's lengthy and often disjointed
arguments. As discussed below, the objections are without
Objection - 42 U.S.C. § 1981
argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when she ruled that
the court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Plaintiff contends that she properly
asserted a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and
therefore, her complaint was filed within the four year
statute of limitations period.
Magistrate Judge correctly construed Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint as relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When a
suit is brought against a state actor, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights
guaranteed in 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Jett v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701. Further, individuals
cannot be liable under § 1981 unless “they
‘intentionally cause [an employer] to infringe the
rights secured by' section 1981.” Carson v.
Giant Food, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 462, 483 (D.Md. 2002)
(quoting Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1145 (4th Cir. 1975).
party disputes that the SCDLLR is a state actor. Furthermore,
as to defendant Director Holly Gillespie Pisarik (Pisarik),
Plaintiff does not properly allege a claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff does not allege that Pisarik
intentionally caused SCDLLR to infringe on the rights secured
by § 1981. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge properly
construed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as only a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
Objection - ...