United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division
L. Wooten Chief United States District Judge.
the Court is Petitioner Job Taylor's second motion for
reconsideration of the Court's order dismissing his
§ 2255 petition. A Rule 59(e) motion may only be granted
“(1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice. It is an extraordinary remedy
that should be applied sparingly.” Mayfield v.
Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674
F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Petitioner's motion, he argues that (1) he was sentenced
only as an armed career criminal, not a career offender; (2)
the concurrent sentence doctrine does not apply because he
continues to suffer collateral consequences from his ACCA
designation; and (3) his petition was timely filed because
Mathis applies retroactively. There is no merit to
any of these arguments.
Petitioner's argument that he was only sentenced as an
armed career criminal, not as a career offender, he is simply
incorrect. Paragraph 33 of the PSR provides as follows:
Chapter Four Enhancements: As shown in Part
B (Criminal History) below, the defendant has at least two
prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense. Since the instant offense [the
PWID conviction] involves a controlled substance offense and
the defendant was 18 years or older at the time of its
commission, the defendant is a career offender within the
meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The offense level
determined under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 is 37 rather than the
lower level calculated above.
he does not address the fact that he was sentenced pursuant
to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement to 262 months, rather than
the guidelines. See Plea Agreement ¶ 7, ECF No.
7. His argument that he was only sentenced as an armed career
criminal, not a career offender, is simply meritless.
his argument regarding the collateral source doctrine, he
believes that if his ACCA designation is invalidated, he
would only have to pay a single special assessment of $100
because “from a strictly legal standpoint, Count 1 and
2 have to merge because the Counts were grouped, and the
special penalty assessment can only be assessed once; to
assessed Mr. Taylor twice was illegal.” ECF No. 86 at
8. He is incorrect. Special assessments are dictated by
statute, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3013. Subsection
(a)(2)(A) provides that “[t]he court shall assess on
any person convicted of an offense against the United States
. . . in the case of a felony . . . the amount of $100 if the
defendant is an individual . . . .” The fact that the
two offenses for which Petitioner was convicted-PWID 5 Grams
or More of Cocaine and Felon in Possession of a Firearm and
Ammunition-were grouped for purposes of determining the
applicable guideline range has no impact on the special
assessments, which are required by statute. His two
convictions require separate special assessments under 18
U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A), regardless of whether or not he
was designated an armed career criminal as to the felon in
possession count. Accordingly, there is no merit to this
as to Petitioner's argument that his § 2255 petition
was timely filed because Mathis v. United States,
136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016) applies retroactively, he is not
entitled to relief because Mathis does not restart
the statute of limitations. While he is correct that
Mathis applies retroactively, see Jones v.
United States, No. 4:02-cr-01017-TLW-1, 2017 WL 3620056,
at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 23, 2017) (explaining why Mathis
applies retroactively), that is irrelevant for two reasons.
the fact that Mathis applies retroactively on
collateral attack does not mean that it restarts the statute
of limitations under § 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (f)(3), as
that only applies to rights that are newly recognized by the
Supreme Court. Mathis does not set forth a newly
recognized right. As this Court noted in Jones,
Mathis is the latest entry in a long line of cases
attempting to clarify the application of the categorical and
modified categorical approaches to deciding when a prior
conviction is properly counted as a predicate offense. As the
Supreme Court explained, Mathis did not announce a
new rule and instead reaffirmed the approach going back at
least twenty-five years from Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), through Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), Descamps v.
United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), and others.
Jones, 2017 WL 3620056, at *3. Accordingly,
Mathis did not restart the statute of limitations
under § 2255(f)(3).
even if he did not have the statute of limitations problem,
he would not be entitled to relief for the reasons set forth
in the Court's order denying his initial motion to
reconsider, specifically the concurrent sentence doctrine and
the fact that he was sentenced pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
agreement, rather than the guidelines.
these reasons, as well as the reasons set forth in the order
on the prior motion to reconsider and the order dismissing
Petitioner's § 2255 petition, the Court concludes
that he has not set forth sufficient grounds to cause the
Court to alter or amend its prior orders. Therefore, his
motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 86, is