United States District Court, D. South Carolina
PAUL B. GOIST, a/k/a PAUL BENJAMIN GOIST, Petitioner,
BRYAN ANTONELLI, WARDEN, FCI WILLIAMSBURG, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Bristow Marchant United States Magistrate Judge
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on December 4,
2017, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Federal
Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Salters,
December 18, 2017, prior to service on the Respondent,
Petitioner filed a motion to expedite. After being served,
the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary
judgment, on February 7, 2018. As the Petitioner is
proceeding pro se, a Roseboro order was
entered by the Court on February 8, 2018, advising Petitioner
of the importance of a motion for summary judgment and of the
necessity for him to file an adequate response. Petitioner
was specifically advised that if he failed to respond
adequately, the Respondent39;s motion may be granted,
thereby ending his case. Petitioner thereafter filed a
Traverse and Motion in Opposition on February 20, 2018.
matter is now before the Court for disposition.[2" name="FN2" id="FN2">2]
record before the Court shows that Petitioner was sentenced
by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio on October 18, 2001, to a 240 month term of
imprisonment, with a 3 year term of supervision, for a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Bank Robbery).
See Respondent39;s Exhibit One, p. 2.
Petitioner39;s projected date of release is August 4, 2018,
via Good Conduct Time (GCT) release. Id. Petitioner
raises the following issues in his Petition:
Ground One: The [Residential Re-entry Center
(“RRC”)] placement center has exceeded its
authority to change RRC placement dates and these acts run
afoul of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 3621(b);
Ground Two: That RRC [ ] is a Third Party
Independent Contractor and has no authority to make changes
or placement dates or determine other factors outlined in
Section 3621 of Title 18;
Ground Three: That the Federal Prisons is
ignoring the mandates of 3624(c) that they “must afford
prisoners a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare
for the reentry of that prisoner into the community.”
Id 18 U.S.C. Section 3624(c)(emphasis added).
See Attachment to Petition, p. 3.
requests this Court to issue a mandate to the United States
Parole Commission (“Parole Commission”) to
release him to RRC placement, or in the alternative to either
home confinement or restore good conduct credits to offset
the violation and immediately release him from federal
custody.[3" name="FN3" id=
"FN3">3] The Respondent denies the Petitioner39;s
allegations and opposes his requested relief
judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P; see Habeas Corpus Rules 5-7,
11. Further, while the federal court is charged with
liberally construing pleadings filed by a pro se
litigant to allow the development of a potentially
meritorious case; See Cruz v. Beto, 319');">405 U.S. 319
(1972), and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972);
the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that
the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to
allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the
court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep39;t of Social
Services, 2d 387');">901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case
does not contest that Petitioner39;s claim that he was
entitled to additional time in an RRC placement may be
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, Respondent does
dispute that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative
remedies with respect to this claim. See Hughes v.
Slade, 347 F.Supp.2d 821');">347 F.Supp.2d 821 (C.D.Cal.2004); Jimenez v.
Warden, FDIC, Fort Devens, Massachusetts, 147 F.Supp.2d
24, 27 (D.Mass. June 8, 2001); United States v.
Shanklin, No. 87-7395, 1988 WL 41128 at * 2 (4th Cir.
April 28, 1988); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730
F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir.1984) [“It is only when a
prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies that he
becomes entitled to litigate the matter in the district
court.”]. See also Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d
1321 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Mathis, 689
F.2d 1364, 1365 (11th Cir.1982).
Respondent concedes that Petitioner properly filed his
Administrative Remedy and Regional Administrative Appeal to
the Regional Director, both necessary steps for
administrative exhaustion, Respondent contends that
Petitioner failed to properly pursue an appeal to the Central
Office prior to filing this federal petition. The record
provided confirms Respondent's argument. The Petitioner
filed an appeal with the BOP's Central Office on December
4, 2017 (dated December 1, 2017). See
Respondent's Exhibit Two [Court Docket No. 12-2, p. 26];
see also Attachment to Petition [Court Docket No.
1-2, pp. 8-9]. By rule, the Central office thereafter had 40
calendar days to respond to the appeal. Otherwise, the inmate
may assume the appeal is denied and may proceed with a court
filing. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. Here, the 40 day response
time for the Central Office to respond to Petitioner's
appeal ended on January 13, 2018. See28 C.F.R.
§ 542.18; see also Respondent's Exhibit
Two. However, rather than waiting on a response, ...