United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Robert William Wazney, a state prisoner proceeding
pro se, has filed a complaint seeking to have this
Court issue an injunction to hold in abeyance the foreclosure
of certain real property he mortgaged to the defendant
JPMorgan Chase Bank National Association (doc. 1 at 4). The
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the South Carolina
Department of Corrections' Lee Correctional Institution.
He has filed this action in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915. The Plaintiff's complaint is subject
to summary dismissal for the reasons set forth below.
Plaintiff alleges that in 1997, he married the defendant
Sharon Renee Wazney, a/k/a Sharon Renee Chobassole
(“Wife”) (doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 8). In 2003, the
Plaintiff gave a mortgage to the defendant JPMorgan Chase
Bank National Association (“Chase”) that
encumbered certain real property known as 2040 Hideaway
Drive, in Sumter, South Carolina (the “Property”)
(doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 9).
2013, the Plaintiff was incarcerated, and Wife filed for
divorce (doc. 1 at 2, ¶¶ 11-12). The Plaintiff
alleges that the defendant Sumter County Family Court ordered
Wife to pay the mortgage on the Property (doc. 1 at 2, ¶
15). The Plaintiff further contends that although Wife has
collected rent from the Property, Wife has failed to make
mortgage payments to Chase, causing Chase to commence
foreclosure proceedings against the Property (doc. 1 at 2,
¶¶ 13-14, 16).
to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local
Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is
authorized to review the complaint for relief and submit
findings and recommendations to the District Court. The
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute
authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is
satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or
malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
pro se litigant, the Plaintiff's pleadings are
accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam). However, even under this less stringent
standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to
summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction
does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in
the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim
cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir.
Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal. In
the present case, the Plaintiff asks the court “to hold
the foreclosure process in abeyance until I can manage my
assets to where I can remedy the backed [sic] payments, [and]
to temporarily stop any and all foreclosure action regarding
the [Property]” (doc. 1 at 4). The court construes
Plaintiff's request as seeking to have this court enjoin
Chase from proceeding with its foreclosure of the
Anti-Injunction Act provides that “[a] court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2293. Although the Act enumerates three exceptions,
none is applicable to the present case.
injunction issued against parties to a state court
proceeding is, for purposes of the Act, considered an
injunction to stay the state court proceeding itself.”
In re MI Windows and Doors, Inc., Prods. Liab.
Litig., 860 F.3d 218, 224 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing
Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970)). Here, the
Plaintiff seeks to have this court “hold the
foreclosure process in abeyance” until he can make
arrangements to pay the arrearage. The relief the Plaintiff
seeks is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, and his action
should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Liggett v. Fifth Third Mortg., C/A
7:16-4011-HMH-JDA, 2017 WL 4083136, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 14,
2017), report and recommendation adopted, C/A
7:16-4011-HMH-JDA, 2017 WL 4074884 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2017).
recommended that the district court dismiss this action
without prejudice and without issuance and service of
process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1972). The ...