United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division
Kevin C. Bradley, Petitioner,
Warden, Lieber Correctional Institution, Respondent.
F. Anderson, Jr., Judge
C. Bradley (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner
proceeding pro se, seeks habeas corpus relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2),
D.S.C., the case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for
Magistrate Judge assigned to this action prepared a
thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”) and
opines that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 28) should be granted. (ECF No. 38 p. 38). The Report
sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of
law on this matter, and this Court incorporates those facts
and standards without a recitation. Petitioner was advised of
his right to object to the Report, which was entered on the
docket on January 31, 2018. (ECF No. 38). The Magistrate
Judge required Plaintiff to file objections by February 14,
2018. (ECF No. 38). Petitioner filed a Motion for extension
of time on February 16, 2018, and the Court granted the
Motion on February 21, 2018. (ECF No. 46). Petitioner
subsequently filed his objections on March 2, 2018. (ECF No.
49). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
district court is only required to conduct a de novo
review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's
Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W.
Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th
Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions
of the Magistrate's Report, this Court is not required to
give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See
Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
attempts to make several objections to the Report (ECF No.
49), most of which are repetitions of Petitioner's
assertions in his Petition (ECF No. 21). Petitioner's
assertions are vague, and none could be construed as definite
enough to constitute an objection. However, the objections
are addressed below. Each is without merit.
first objection, Petitioner reasserts an argument from his
earlier petition (ECF No. 21 p. 22)-that Petitioner did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a direct appeal;
that trial counsel did not consult with him about an appeal;
and that he asked counsel to file an appeal. (ECF No. 49 p.
2-4). He asserts that the Magistrate erred, as well as the
Post-Conviction Relief Court (“PCR court”), in
finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
file an appeal or notice of an appeal. (ECF No. 49 p. 2- 3).
Petitioner, however, makes no specific objection to the
Magistrate's Report. Moreover, the PCR court clearly
established that Petitioner “knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to a direct appeal.”
See (ECF No. 29-3 p. 59). Therefore,
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
second objection, Petitioner builds onto his first objection,
claiming that the PCR court erred in determining that trial
counsel's testimony was credible and Petitioner's was
not. (ECF No. 29-3 p. 59). However, simply claiming that the
finding “should be overturned” (ECF No. 49 p. 4)
does not constitute a specific objection. Moreover, unless
the PCR court's determination regarding Petitioner's
credibility is clearly an error, this Court should not
disturb its findings. See Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d
783, 850 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, there is no such error.
Therefore, Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Petitioner's third argument, much like the first and
second, he attacks trial counsel's testimony again. (ECF
No. 49 p. 5). However, as discussed above, the PCR court
determined that trial counsel's testimony was reliable.
Moreover, Petitioner's assertion does not constitute a
specific objection. Therefore, this argument is without