United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division
Bryan Harwell United States District Judge.
Charles Sampson, proceeding pro se, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter is before the
Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (“R
& R”) of United States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D.
West, who recommends denying Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, granting Defendant Cartwright's and
Defendant Jones' motions for summary judgment, and
dismissing them from this case. See ECF No. 93.
Review of the R & R
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.
The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive
weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination
remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review
of those portions of the R & R to which specific
objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the
Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been
filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de
novo review when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a
specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v.
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews
only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the
Court need not give any explanation for adopting the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., Md.,
789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015); see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”). “A party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record
. . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or
that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The facts and
inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 413, but the Court
“cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of
the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015).
“the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “A dispute of
material fact is ‘genuine' if sufficient evidence
favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to
return a verdict for that party.” Seastrunk v.
United States, 25 F.Supp.3d 812, 814 (D.S.C. 2014). A
fact is “material” if proof of its existence or
nonexistence would affect disposition of the case under the
applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
summary judgment stage, “the moving party must
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Once the moving party has met his burden, the nonmoving party
must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere
allegations contained in the pleadings to show that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of
Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal
citation omitted). Summary judgment is not warranted unless,
“from the totality of the evidence, including
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
affidavits, the [C]ourt believes no genuine issue of material
fact exists for trial and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Whiteman v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 385 (4th
Cir. 2013); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
brings this § 1983 action against Defendants Derrick
Cartwright, Andy Bethea, and Troy Jones claiming his home was
illegally searched while police officers were searching for
his son Levonda Page, the suspect of a recent
shooting. Defendants Cartwright and Jones have
answered and filed motions for summary judgment, and
Plaintiff has filed his own motion for summary
judgment.See ECF Nos. 69, 71, & 72. The
Magistrate Judge has entered an R & R recommending that
the Court deny Plaintiff's motion, grant Defendant
Cartwright's and Defendant Jones' motions, and
dismiss these two defendants from this case. See ECF
No. 93. Notably, the Magistrate Judge attached a
“Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and
Recommendation” informing Plaintiff that
“[o]bjections must specifically identify the portions
of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made
and the basis for such
objections.” ECF No. 93-1 (emphasis
the time for filing objections,  Plaintiff filed a document
entitled “Response to Report and Recommendation,
” the majority of which is simply a copy of various
portions of the R & R. See ECF No. 95. The Court
reiterates that in the absence of a specific objection, it
need only review for clear error and need not explain its
reasons for adopting the Magistrate Judge's proposed
findings and recommendations. See Orpiano, 687 F.2d
at 47; Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718
F.2d at 199-200.
in his Response, Plaintiff does make several statements of
his own that could be liberally construed as specific
objections. See generally Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (stating “[a] document filed pro se
is ‘to be liberally ...