United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division
F. Anderson, Jr. United States District Judge
Hahn, (“Hahn” or “Petitioner”),
proceeding pro se, is an inmate incarcerated at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Edgefield, South
Carolina. Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule
73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the case was referred to the
Magistrate Judge assigned to this action prepared a
thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”) and
opines that this Court should dismiss the Petition in this
case without prejudice. (ECF No. 28). The Report sets forth,
in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this
matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards
without a recitation.
Court is charged with making a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report to which specific objections
are made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge,
or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
However, a district court is only required to conduct a
de novo review of the specific portions of the
Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b);
Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific
objections to portions of the Report of the Magistrate, this
Court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the
recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,
199 (4th Cir. 1983).
was advised of his right to object to the Report, which was
entered on the docket on November 20, 2017. (ECF No. 28).
Petitioner filed his objections to the Report
(“Objections”) on January 8, 2018. (ECF No. 34).
On January 22, 2018, Respondent filed a Reply to
Petitioner's Objections. (ECF No. 35). Thus, this matter
is ripe for review.
attempts to make several objections to the Report (ECF No.
34), most of which are repetitions of Petitioner's
assertions in his Petition (ECF No. 1). Although vague, some
of Petitioner's assertions could be construed as definite
enough to constitute an objection. However, each of these
objections is without merit.
To Clarify, Respondent Filed a Motion to Dismiss, Not a
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Petitioner objects to the Report “insofar as the Report
states that Respondent has filed a Motion for ‘summary
judgment' under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.” (ECF No. 34 p.
3). Petitioner is correct. In fact, Respondent moved to
dismiss on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the test
from In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir.
2000), and it is not a motion for summary judgment pursuant
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See (ECF No. 17). However, this technical error does
not have a dispositive effect on the case at issue.
Magistrate, after stating that Respondent filed a
“motion for summary judgment” (ECF No. 28 p. 1),
later in the discussion section of the Report states that
“this action is subject to dismissal because . . .
.” (ECF No. 28 p. 7). Furthermore, the Magistrate
recommended that “the Petition in this action be
dismissed, without prejudice.” (ECF No. 28 p. 11)
(emphasis omitted). Thus, this particular objection warrants
no further discussion because the Magistrate analyzed the
case as a motion to dismiss and made a mere typographical
error in its Report.
Petition Failed to Satisfy the First and Second Prong of the
In re Jones Test.
Petitioner's objects to the Report's finding that
Petitioner failed to satisfy the first and second prongs of
the test from In re Jones. This is a substantive
issue, and it is thus addressed below.
threshold matter, the Report states that Petition should have
been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 instead of 28
U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 28 p. 7-8). The crux of
Hahn's argument, however, is that the decision in
United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir.
2015) (en banc) renders the “[i]ndictment [as]
defective” and, more specifically, “Count IV
cannot stand.” See (ECF No. 34 p. 9).
“However, § 2241 may be utilized by a federal
prisoner to challenge the legality of his or her conviction
or sentence if he or she can satisfy the mandates of the