United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
ORDER AND OPINION
Richard Mark Gergel United States District Court Judge
matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendations
of the Magistrate Judge, recommending that Defendants Alex
Middleton and Charleston County School District's motion
to dismiss, Alan Wilson, Dru James, Jim Griffith, and the
South Carolina Department of Education's motion to
dismiss, Defendant the U.S. Attorney for the District of
South Carolina's motion to dismiss, Defendants Nancy
McGinley, Gerrita Postlewait, Bobbie Grant, and Bill
Briggman's motion to dismiss, and Defendants Walker
Willcox and Katherine Ryan's motion for summary judgment
be granted, and on Defendant Pamela Brock, Teresa A Knox,
Noelle Redd, the South Carolina Board of Education, the South
Carolina Department of Revenue, and James Turner's motion
to dismiss and Defendants Holly Aguilar and Austin
Harris's motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendations as the
Orders of the Court and grants Defendants' motions to
proceeding pro se, has filed this action alleging
causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"), Title IX of the Education Amendments Act
of 1972, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and possibly other
federal statutes. (See Dkt. No. 83 (second amended
complaint).) Plaintiff is an African-American male over 40
years of age. (Id. at 1.)
claims appear to relate to his attempts to gain employment as
a teacher with the Charleston County School District
("CCSD"). Plaintiff makes additional allegations
regarding his attempts to receive a teaching certificate, his
past criminal proceedings, and the collection action for his
student loan debt. This action was commenced on July 6, 2016,
and all twenty Defendants have now filed motions to dismiss
or for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge has issued
Report and Recommendations regarding Defendants Alex
Middleton and the CCSD's motion to dismiss, Defendants
Alan Wilson, Dru James, Jim Griffith, and the South Carolina
Department of Education's motion to dismiss, Defendant
the United States Attorney for the District of South
Carolina's motion to dismiss, and Defendants Nancy
McGinley, Gerrita Postlewait, Bobbie Grant, and Bill
Briggman's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 145); Defendants
Walker Willcox and Katherine Ryan's motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. No. 147); and Plaintiffs motion for injunctive
relief, motion to vacate, and motion for relief from a
judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Dkt. No. 151). Plaintiff has filed objections to
the Report and Recommendations.
Report and Recommendation has been entered regarding
Defendants Pamela Brock, Teresa A Knox, Noelle Redd, the
South Carolina Board of Education, the South Carolina
Department of Revenue, and James Turner's motion to
dismiss or Defendants Holly Aguilar and Austin Harris's
motion to dismiss, but those motions have been fully briefed
following the issuance of Roseboro orders to
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The
Court is charged with making a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which
specific objection is made. The Court may accept reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
proper objection is made to a particular issue, "a
district court is required to consider all arguments directed
to that issue, regardless of whether they were raised before
the magistrate." United States v. George, 971
F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992). However, "[f]he
district court's decision whether to consider additional
evidence is committed to its discretion, and any refusal will
be reviewed for abuse." Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d
170, 183 & n.9 (4th Cir. 2002). "[A]ttempts to
introduce new evidence after the magistrate judge has acted
are disfavored, " though the district court may allow it
"when a party offers sufficient reasons for so
doing." Caldwell v. Jackson, 831 F.Supp.2d 911,
914 (M.D. N.C. 2010) (listing cases).
Motion to Dismiss
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the
dismissal of an action if the complaint fails "to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted." Such a motion
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and "does
not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of the
claim, or the applicability of defenses. . . . Our inquiry
then is limited to whether the allegations constitute 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief" Republican Party of
N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court is obligated to "assume the truth of
all facts alleged in the complaint] and the existence of any
fact that can be proved, consistent with the complaint's
allegations." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs.
Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
However, while the Court must accept the facts in a light
most favorable to the non- moving party, it "need not
accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable
conclusions, or arguments." Id.
survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Bell Ail. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although the
requirement of plausibility does not impose a probability
requirement at this stage, the complaint must show more than
a "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A complaint has "facial plausibility"
where the pleading "allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Id.
judgment is appropriate if a party "shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In other words, summary judgment should
be granted "only when it is clear that there is no
dispute concerning either the facts of the controversy or the
inferences to be drawn from those facts." Pulliamln
v. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.
1987). "In determining whether a genuine issue has been
raised, the court must construe all inferences and
ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party."
HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross,
101 F.3d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1996). The party seeking
summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
the moving party has made this threshold demonstration, the
non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment,
may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings.
Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must
demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give
rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard,
"[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,
nor does a 'mere scintilla of evidence'" in
support of the non-moving party's case. Thompson v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir.
2002) (quoting Phillips v. CSX Transp., Inc., 190
F.3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Motion to Dismiss by Alex Middleton and the Charleston ...