United States District Court, D. South Carolina
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Wright (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, brings
this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner alleges he is a pretrial
detainee at the Charleston County Detention Center
(“CCDC”), and he files this action in forma
pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This case is
subject to summary dismissal.
alleges he is detained in the CCDC, and he has an attorney
appointed to represent him in the state pending criminal
case. [Docs. 1, 1-2.] He alleges that he has been charged
with numerous crimes but that he is being unlawfully detained
and deprived of constitutional rights and protections in his
state court criminal proceedings. [Id.]
appears to contend that he is being denied adequate
representation due to his poverty status, that the State is
refusing to comply with discovery rules and procedures in the
pending state criminal action, and that he is being detained
unlawfully in violation of his “right to freedom,
liberty and justice.” [Id.] Petitioner fails
to aver facts to support his claims, and instead presents
lengthy string citations to case law and court rules.
[Id.] Petitioner requests that this Court to order
his immediate release and that all charges against him be
refers to seven warrants in his Petition. This Court takes
judicial notice from the Charleston County online court
records that Plaintiff was arrested on August 12, 2014, and
charged with the following crimes, which remain pending
against him: murder; attempted murder; possession of a weapon
during a violent crime; burglary, first degree; armed
robbery; and accessory before the fact to a felony.
See Charleston County Ninth Judicial Circuit Public
PISearch.aspx (enter Plaintiff's name, and
2014A1011300051, 2014A1011300052, 2014A1011300053,
2014A1011300054, 2014A1011300055, 2014A1011300056,
2014A1011300057) (last visited Nov. 14, 2017); see also
Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th
Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice
of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins.
Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989)
(“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial
notice is in noticing the content of court
to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local
Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) DSC, the undersigned is authorized
to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and
recommendations to the district court. Petitioner filed this
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma
pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District
Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,
” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit
to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition
and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled
to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts
(2012); see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012) (a district
court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not
filed pursuant to § 2254).
pro se litigant, Petitioner's pleadings are accorded
liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam).
However, even under this less stringent standard, the
Petition in this case is subject to summary dismissal. The
requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the
Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege
facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal
district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Ordinarily, federal habeas corpus relief for a state prisoner
is available post-conviction. However, pretrial petitions for
habeas corpus are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, “‘which applies to persons in custody
regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and
regardless of the present status of the case pending against
him.'” United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d
381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dickerson v.
Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987)). Generally
though, “‘an attempt to dismiss an indictment or
otherwise prevent a prosecution'” is not attainable
through federal habeas corpus. Dickerson, 816 F.2d
at 226 (quoting Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280 (5th
Cir. 1976)). And, a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 can only be sought after the
petitioner has exhausted his state remedies.[*] See Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973)
(exhaustion required under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Moore
v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442-43 (3rd Cir. 1975)
(exhaustion required under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
with regard to the exhaustion requirement for federal court
jurisdiction under § 2241, it is well settled that
“federal courts should abstain from the exercise of
that jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be
resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or
by other state procedures available to the petitioner.”
Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225 (collecting cases).
in Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that a
federal court should not equitably interfere with state
criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and
extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v.
Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The
Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not
act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and
will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971);