United States District Court, D. South Carolina
E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
an action filed by a pro se non-prisoner litigant.
Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) of the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina, pretrial
proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned
United States Magistrate Judge.
is associated with a group of Plaintiffs who claim prior
employment with or ownership of the business Skydive Myrtle
Beach. These individuals each filed actions based on the same
claims and facts against the same sixty-six defendants.
See Davis v. Horry County Council, et al, No.
4:17-391-RBH-TER; Herdt v. Horry County Council, et
al, No. 4:17-392-RBH; Karahalios v. Horry County
Council, et al, No. 4:17-393-RBH-TER; Ringley v.
Horry County Council, et al, No. 4:17-395-RBH-TER;
Holly v. Horry County Council, et al, No.
4:17-396-RBH-TER; Herzog v. Horry County Council, et
al, No. 4:17-398-RBH-TER; Boulineau v. Horry County
Council, et al, No. 4:17-394-RBH; Dron, v. Horry
County Council, et al, No. 4:17-397-RBH; Bracey, v.
Horry County Council, et al, No. 4:17-399-RBH-TER;
Guillen v. Horry County Council, et al, No.
4:17-400-RBH; Clarke v. Horry County Council, et al,
motions, both dispositive and non-dispositive, have been
filed in this action. All pretrial proceedings in this case
were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule
Motion to the Court of Defendants Counsel for RVA and its
Employees T. McRoy Shelley for Improper Representation (ECF
Robinson Aviation, Richard Allen, Jack Griffin, Glenn Ray,
Bill Tiller, and Phil Zell filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
41) through their counsel, T. McRoy Shelley, III. In the
present motion, Plaintiff asks the court to order Mr. Shelley
to “comply with the court's rules by entering his
appearance if he/she wishes to represent those clients and to
properly notify the Plaintiff of their representation.”
Motion (ECF No. 64) p. 1. Plaintiff does not mention the
court rules to which he is referring. Nevertheless, Mr.
Shelley's filing of the Motion to Dismiss, in which he
included his address, email address, and telephone number,
see Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a), is sufficient to put this
court, Plaintiff, and all other parties in this matter on
notice that Mr. Shelley represents these Defendants.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
First Motion to Strike (ECF No. 67)
first Motion to Strike (ECF No. 67), Plaintiff asks the court
“to strike in part the Defendants response motion and
opposition to Plaintiff's motion for extension of
time.” Motion (ECF. No. 67) p. 1. As is the case for
most, if not all, of Plaintiff's filings, he fails to
specifically identify the filings to which he is referring
with a docket number or by stating which Defendants filed the
document. As an initial matter, the only Motion for Extension
of Time (ECF No. 39) filed by Plaintiff was granted,
see Text Order (ECF No. 55) prior to Plaintiff's
Motion to Strike. Therefore, the Motion to Strike is moot in
it appears that the “response motion” to which
Plaintiff refers is a motion to dismiss, although three
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 26, 41, 50) had been filed at
the time Plaintiff filed his motion to strike. Nevertheless,
regardless of which motion Plaintiff is addressing, the
relief he seeks is improper. Plaintiff asks the court to
strike, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), “any part of their
response motion that has nothing to do with the Plaintiff
(striking the part of Amanda Boulineau which has nothing to
do with this Plaintiff) and any statements about emotional
stress or in any manner that has to do with financial
burdens.” Motion (ECF No. 67) p. 2. However, Rule 12(f)
motions apply to pleadings only and are not available to
strike material contained in motions. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f); Pilgrim v. Trustees of Tufts
College, 118 F.3d 864, 868 (1st Cir.
1997). As a practical matter, it appears that
Plaintiff is using this motion to strike to oppose a motion
to dismiss, and the proper vehicle for such opposition in
most occasions is a response to the motion, not a separate
motion. For these reasons, Plaintiff's first motion to
strike is denied.
Motion to Disqualify Counsel (ECF No. 74) and Second Motion
to Strike (ECF No. 70)
these motions, Plaintiff seeks to disqualify Mike Battle as
counsel for Horry County Council, Harold Worley, Mark
Lazarus, Bill Howard, Jimmy Washington, Gary Loftus, Tyler
Servant, Cam Crawford, Harold Phillips, Johnny Vaught, W.
Paul Prince, Jody Prince, Al Allen, Pat Apone, Jason Terrei,
Charles Bree, Chad Cox, Jack Teal, Tim Jackson, Randall
Smith, Sarah Glanders, Kirk Lovell, Lisa Bourcier, Chris
Eldridge, Randolph Haldi, Arrigo Carotti, Frank Venegas, and
HCDA (the Horry County Defendants) and to strike any filings
made by Battle. Plaintiff argues that a conflict of interest
exists between Plaintiff and Battle “due to his acts of
perjury in the lower courts.” Motion (ECF No. 74) p. 1.
Plaintiff asserts that Battle lied during eviction
proceedings by stating that the lease held by SkyDive Myrtle
Beach had expired and had not been renewed when Battle knew
that Skydive Myrtle Beach held a valid lease agreement. Thus,
Plaintiff argues, he plans to depose Battle and other
employees of his firm in this action. Plaintiff also asserts
that a conflict of interest exists between some of
Battle's clients, namely between Horry County Council and
its members and the Horry County Department of Airports
(HCDA) and its employees. Plaintiff appears to argue that a
conflict exists because these are two different entities of
government “that conspired together.”
motion to disqualify counsel is a matter subject to the
court's general supervisory authority to ensure fairness
to all who bring their case to the judiciary for
resolution.” Clinton Mills, Inc. v. Alexander &
Alexander, Inc., 687 F.Supp. 226, 228 (D.S.C.1988).
“The South Carolina Code of Professional Responsibility
sets forth the ethical standards for attorneys who practice
in this district.” Reeves v. Town of
Cottageville, No. 2:12-CV-02765-DCN, 2014 WL 4231235, at
*1 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2014) (citing Local Civil Rule 83.I.08
DSC, RDE Rule IV(B) (“The Code of Professional
Responsibility adopted by this Court is the South Carolina
Rules of Professional Conduct ... adopted by the Supreme
Court of the State of South Carolina....”)).
3.7 of the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which
the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another
lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a
witness unless precluded from ...