United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division
OPINION AND ORDER
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the court on Defendant's motion pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). ECF No. 161. Defendant's motion
argues a defect in the Order granting summary judgment for
the Government on his original motion pursuant to §
2255. Specifically, Defendant argues the court applied the
wrong standard when it granted summary judgment on his 2002
§ 2255 motion. He also argues his sentence should be
reduced based on the Supreme Court's decision in Dean
v. United States, 581 U.S., 137 S.Ct. 1170 (2017) and a
New York District Court's decision in United States
v. Holloway, 62 F.Supp.2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). The
Government filed a motion to dismiss Defendant's Rule
60(b) motion and a memorandum in support, arguing
Defendant's motion is, in reality, a second or successive
motion under § 2255 and therefore should be dismissed.
ECF Nos. 164, 164-1. The Government also argued
Defendant's motion is untimely and not a proper Rule
60(b) motion, and that the Holloway Doctrine should
not apply to Defendant's case. Defendant filed a
response, arguing the instant motion is correctly categorized
as a Rule 60(b) motion because he attacks the standard
utilized in his original § 2255 motion, which raises a
defect in the prior proceeding. ECF No. 167. He also reargued
points from the Rule 60(b) filing.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) allows for relief
from a final judgment for ‘any other reason that
justifies relief.' While this catchall reason includes
few textual limitations, its context requires that it may be
invoked in only ‘extraordinary circumstances' when
the reason for relief from judgment does not fall within the
list of enumerated reasons given in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5).
Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 500 (4th Cir. 2011).
A 60(b)(6) motion must be filed on “just terms, ”
within “a reasonable time, ” and “have a
meritorious claim or defense and that the opposing party not
be unfairly prejudiced by having the judgment set
aside.” Id. (citing Nat'l Credit Union
Admin. Bd. v. Gray, 1 F.3d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 1993)). A
“Rule 60(b) motion that challenges ‘some defect
in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings' . . .
is a true Rule 60(b) motion . . .” United States v.
McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531-32 (2005)).
instant motion does not set forth a valid basis for relief
under Rule 60(b)(6). It is, in reality, a successive §
2255 motion. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has directed
that district courts ascertain and address whether Rule 60(b)
motions are, in reality, second or successive motions under
§ 2255. See United States v. Winestock, 340
F.3d 200, 206 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U.S. at 531-32. “[A] motion directly
attacking the prisoner's conviction or sentence will
usually amount to a successive application, while a motion
seeking a remedy for some defect in the collateral review
process will generally be deemed a proper motion for
reconsideration.” Winestock, 340 F.3d at 207;
see also McRae, 793 F.3d at 397 (holding a true Rule
60(b) motion “challenges some defect in the integrity
of the federal habeas proceedings.”).
Defendant's motion alleges a defect in the adjudication
of his original § 2255 motion, in reality it attacks his
sentence. He argues there was a genuine issue of material
fact in his original § 2255 motion, and therefore
summary judgment should not have been granted.However, this is
not an allegation of a defect in the collateral review
process, but an attack on the substance of this
court's resolution of his claim on the merits. See
McRae, 793 F.3d at 397 (“[A] Rule 60(b) motion in
a habeas proceeding that attacks the substance of the federal
court's resolution of a claim on the merits is not a true
Rule 60(b) motion, but rather a successive habeas
this motion is in actuality a § 2255 motion. As such, it
is successive and Defendant has failed to obtain permission
from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive
§ 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)
(“Before a second or successive application permitted
by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant
shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider the
requirement of filing a motion in the court of appeals (in
this instance, the Fourth Circuit) for permission and
securing permission to file a second or successive motion is
jurisdictional. Therefore, Defendant's failure to secure
permission from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals prior to
filing this § 2255 motion is fatal to any action in this
court. Defendant's motion is dismissed as this court is
without jurisdiction to consider it.
governing law provides that:
(c)(2) A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if
the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.
(c)(3) The certificate of appealability . . . shall indicate
which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required
by paragraph (2).
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). A prisoner satisfies this standard
by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find this
court's assessment of his constitutional claims is
debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling
by the district court is likewise debatable. See
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003);
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);
Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). In
this case, the legal standard for the issuance of a
certificate of appealability has not been met. Therefore, a
certificate of appealability is denied.