United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division
Thomas Perkins, and on behalf of Yoshiko Marchbanks c/o Yamashiro House LLC dissolved, Plaintiff,
Glenda Tucker, Gray Court Magistrate, Andrew Turner, Laurens County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
TIMOTHY M. CAIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil
Rule 73.02, D.S.C., this matter was referred to a magistrate
judge for pretrial handling. Before the court is the
magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation
(“Report”) (ECF No. 21), recommending that the
court dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 1) without prejudice and
that the court deny Plaintiff's pending Motion for
Recusal of the Magistrate (ECF No. 4) and Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 12) and terminate those motions as moot.
Plaintiff was advised of his right to file objections to the
Report. (ECF No. 21 at 9). Plaintiff filed objections to the
Report. (ECF No. 24).
recommendations set forth in the Report have no presumptive
weight, and this court remains responsible for making a final
determination in this matter. See Matthews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making
a de novo determination of those portions of a
magistrate judge's report to which a specific objection
is made, and the court may accept, reject, modify, in whole
or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or
recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). However, the court need not conduct a de
novo review when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a
specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of a timely filed,
specific objection, the magistrate judge's conclusions
are reviewed only for clear error. See Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2005).
magistrate judge summarized the facts of this action in her
Report. (ECF No. 21). Briefly stated, Plaintiff was arrested
for breach of peace and detained for several days following
what Plaintiff asserts was a lawful attempt at a
citizen's arrest of a “junkyard gang.” (ECF
No. 1 at 8, 10). Plaintiff asserts that the “junkyard
gang” was playing loud music and burning an animal
torso, so he attempted to arrest them. Id. at 10.
However, the gang refused to comply and chased an unarmed
Plaintiff into the woods. Id. at 5. Plaintiff
alleges that he was arrested by Defendant Andrew Turner
pursuant to a false arrest warrant issued by Magistrate Judge
Glenda Tucker. Id. at 9. Plaintiff believes this may
be in retaliation for him refusing to sell his land to
Magistrate Judge Tucker in 2005. Id.
25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a pleading construed as a
“Motion for Recusal” of Magistrate Judge Tucker
(though Plaintiff contends it is a “motion to
rescue”). (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff asked that Judge
Tucker not handle his state charge. Id.
Additionally, Plaintiff sought to remove his state charge to
the federal courts. Id. On June 8, 2017, Plaintiff
supplemented that motion and requested a “notice of
appeal” from the Gray Court Magistrate decision.
Id. Once more, Plaintiff attempted to invoke federal
jurisdiction over the state criminal charge against him.
16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF
No. 12). He alleges false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 12-1). He alleges that he has
been persecuted against by the white “good ol'
boys” in this system and requests that his damages be
awarded as a matter of law. Id. at 7. Plaintiff asks
for damages for loss of consortium and emotional distress.
Id. He asserts $666, 666.66 in damages and asks that
these be trebled to account for punitive damages.
Id. In his objections to the magistrate judge's
Report, Plaintiff purports to defect from the United States,
and he charges the United States with helping him gain
Japanese citizenship and paying for him to start a life
there. (ECF No. 24 at 2). Before the court is the magistrate
judge's Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's
motion for recusal and motion for summary judgment. (ECF 21).
than containing specific objections to the magistrate
judge's findings, Plaintiff's objections largely
restate his claims and reiterate his distrust of the legal
system. However, the court is able to glean that
the Plaintiff does specifically object to the finding in the
Report that he does not have standing to sue on behalf of
Yoshiko Marchbanks or his dissolved company, Yamashiro House
LLC. Upon review, this court determines that Plaintiff does
not have standing to sue on behalf of either his dissolved
company or Yoshiko Marchbanks.
filed this lawsuit as a pro se plaintiff in forma
pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff
states that he can sue on behalf Yamashiro House LLC.
Plaintiff also asserts that he can sue for Yoshiko Marchbanks
because she is “common law married to the dissolved
company.” These arguments fail for multiple reasons.
Although an individual has the right to litigate his own
claims in federal court, the right to litigate for oneself
does not extend to others. See Myers v. Loudoun Co. Pub.
Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); see also
Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir.
1975) (a pro se petitioner unassisted by counsel cannot be an
advocate for others in a class action). Therefore,
Plaintiff's right to litigate for himself does not extend
to being able to litigate for Ms. Marchbanks or for Yamashiro
a pro se plaintiff cannot represent a company in a civil
action. See e.g. United States v. Hagerman, 545 F.3d
579, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, Plaintiff has no standing
to represent Yamashiro House LLC. It is well established that
a pro se litigant cannot represent a corporation in a civil
action. See Rowland v. California Men's Colony,
506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (“A corporation may appear in
the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”).
Plaintiff contends that his company is not a
“corporation” and that, therefore, he is not
precluded from representing Yamashiro House LLC in this case.
However, courts outside our jurisdiction have held that
limited liability companies, like Yamashiro House LLC, are
precluded from proceeding pro se as well. See e.g.
Hagerman, 545 F.3d at 581-82. Furthermore, Plaintiff has
filed this case in forma pauperis pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which has allowed Plaintiff to file
this action without prepaying fees and costs to the court.
(ECF Nos. 2, 9). The Supreme Court has held that only natural
citizens may take advantage of proceeding in forma
pauperis. Rowland, 506 U.S. at 196. Therefore,
artificial entities, such as limited liability companies, are
precluded from filing cases pursuant to § 1915 and from
benefitting from its provisions. See Id. Thus, even
if Plaintiff had standing to sue on behalf of Yamashiro House
LLC, he could not do so in forma pauperis.
the Plaintiffs remaining objections, this court finds that
the objections were restatements of his initial claims and
that the magistrate has sufficiently disposed of those claims
in her Report. (ECF No. 21).
thorough review of the Report and of the record in accordance
with the standard set forth above, the court adopts the
Report and incorporates it herein by reference. Therefore,
Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED
Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal of the ...