United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division
Bryan Harwell United States District Judge
26, 2017, the Court issued an order granting Respondent's
motion for summary judgment and denying and dismissing
Petitioner's § 2255 motion with prejudice, and the
Clerk entered judgment the same day. See ECF Nos.
109 & 110. On July 24, 2017,  Petitioner filed a Motion to
Reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e). See ECF No. 114.
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to file a
motion to alter or amend a judgment within twenty-eight days
after entry of the judgment. “A district court has the
discretion to grant a Rule 59(e) motion only in very narrow
circumstances: (1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice.” Hill v. Braxton,
277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A party may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to make
arguments it could have made before judgment was entered.
Id. A party's mere disagreement with the
court's ruling does not warrant a Rule 59(e) motion, and
such motion should not be used to rehash arguments previously
presented or to submit evidence which should have been
previously submitted. Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d
1076, 1081-82 (4th Cir. 1993).
presents two primary arguments in his Motion to Reconsider.
His first argument concerns Ground Two of the § 2255
motion. See ECF No. 114 at pp. 1-2. The Court denied
relief on this ground, finding Petitioner's sentence was
properly enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal
Act(“ACCA”) because his three
prior convictions for serious drug offenses were committed on
occasions different from one another, and therefore trial
counsel was not ineffective for not arguing otherwise.
See ECF No. 109 at pp. 5-7. Petitioner asserts that
under United States v. Hobbs, 136 F.3d 384 (4th Cir.
1998)-which the Court cited in its order-“crimes
committed on different dates can arise from a continuous
course of criminal conduct if the same victim is
involved.” ECF No. 114 at p. 1. Petitioner contends
that because his three drug distributions involved the same
undercover officer and because “[a]n arrest warrant
could have issued following the initial sale, ” his
prior offenses “should be counted as a single
continuous course of conduct.” Id. at pp. 1-2.
However, as the Court explained in its order,
Petitioner's argument is clearly foreclosed by United
States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1995),
wherein the Fourth Circuit found two drug sales to the same
undercover officer less than two hours apart did not
constitute a single occasion:
We also cannot conclude that these two sales constituted a
single occasion because the undercover officer to whom the
drugs were sold chose not to arrest Letterlough after the
first sale. Although Letterlough would like to assign some
culpability for the second sale to the undercover officer who
purchased the drugs, the responsibility for the crime falls
squarely on Letterlough. We cannot disregard the additional
criminal activity simply because the government allowed
Letterlough to engage in it. To do so would force officers to
arrest all evildoers as soon as they see a crime committed;
it would destroy large scale police “sting”
operations and undercover infiltrations, as were present in
Id. at 337. The Court reaffirms its finding that
Petitioner's three convictions were committed on
different occasions, and therefore his sentence was properly
enhanced under the ACCA.
Petitioner seeks a certificate of appealability, which the
Court previously denied. See ECF No. 109 at p. 7.
The Court again denies a certificate of appealability because
Petitioner has failed to make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
Court finds Petitioner has not pointed to any basis under
Rule 59(e) warranting alteration or amendment of the
Court's judgment on Petitioner's § 2255 motion.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider [ECF No. 114].
IS SO ORDERED.
 Filing date under Houston v.
Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (stating a prisoner's
pleading is deemed filed at the moment of delivery to prison
authorities for forwarding to district court).
 The Motion to Reconsider does not
raise new claims not presented in Petitioner's §
2255 motion, and therefore it does not implicate the concerns
discussed in United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d
200 (4th Cir. 2003), and United ...