United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division
PATRICK MICHAEL DUFFY United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's objections to
United States Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker's Report
and Recommendation (“R & R”) (ECF Nos. 63
& 57). The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court grant
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the
following reasons, the Court overrules Plaintiff's
objections, adopts the R & R in part, and grants summary
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The R & R has no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility for making a final determination remains with
the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71
(1976). Parties may make written objections to the R & R
within fourteen days after being served with a copy of it. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court must conduct a de novo
review of any portion of the R & R to which a specific
objection is made, and it may accept, reject, or modify the
Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in whole
or in part. Id. Additionally, the Court may receive
more evidence or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge
with instructions. Id. A party's failure to
object is taken as the party's agreement with the
Magistrate Judge's conclusions. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Absent a timely, specific
objection-or as to those portions of the R & R to which
no specific objection is made-this Court “must
‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on
the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.
2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's
Court applies those standards recognizing that pro
se filings are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and that it must liberally
construe pro se filings to allow the development of
a potentially meritorious case, see Hughes v. Rowe,
449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). That, however, does not mean the Court
can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a
cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff's objections do not address specific portions
of the R & R. Rather, for the most part, Plaintiff has
merely rehashed assertions he made in earlier filings. The
Court summarily overrules those “objections.”
See, e.g., Anderson v. Dobson, 627
F.Supp.2d 619, 623 (W.D. N.C. 2007) (“An
‘objection' that does nothing more than state a
disagreement with a magistrate's suggested resolution, or
simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an
‘objection' as that term is used in this
context.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). The
Court addresses Plaintiff's proper objections
ADA Claim Against the Library Board 
claims the Library Board violated Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.The Magistrate Judge recommends granting
Defendants summary judgment because the record conclusively
shows the Library Board banned Plaintiff because he posed a
direct threat-a complete defense to a Title III claim-and not
because he is disabled. Plaintiff raises several objections
to the Magistrate Judge's analysis. The Court need not
address the analysis or the objections. Plaintiff's claim
fails on another ground.
III forbids the disability-based denial of a person's
enjoyment of any “public accommodation.” 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a). The term “public accommodation,
” however, “‘expressly does not apply to
public entities, ' including state and local
governments.” Crawford v. Dep't of Corr.
Educ., No. 3:11CV430-HEH, 2011 WL 5975254, at *4 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 29, 2011) (quoting Bloom v. Bexar Cty., 130
F.3d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 1997)), aff'd, 472 F.
App'x 192 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); accord
Falchenberg v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., 642
F.Supp.2d 156, 165-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases),
aff'd, 338 F. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam); see also Callum v. CVS Health Corp., 137
F.Supp.3d 817, 839 (D.S.C. 2015) (stating one of the elements
of a Title III claim is that “the defendant is a
private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of
public accommodation” (citing § 12182(a)-(b))). It
is undisputed that the Library Board is a public entity, not
a private one. Thus, Plaintiff's claim fails.
§ 1983 Claims Against the Library Board
Magistrate Judge liberally construed Plaintiff's
complaint to assert claims against the Library Board,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating his
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and
freedom of speech. The Magistrate Judge concluded, however,
that no reasonable jury could find that any of those rights
objections relating to the § 1983 claims consist of
assertions that the Library Board's conduct policy and
the state statute authorizing the Board to promulgate that
policy are unconstitutionally vague, that the Library Board
should have provided him certain documents before his appeal
hearing, and that various library employees conspired against
him. Those assertions are not direct responses to specific
portions of the R & R. Therefore, as mentioned, they are
not proper objections. Moreover, the R & R touches on
only the last of those assertions. The remaining assertions
are theories of liability that cannot be found in, or
liberally inferred from, Plaintiff's complaint. The Court
will not consider those theories, as doing so would in effect
allow Plaintiff to constructively amend his pleading through
his briefs and objections. See Harris v. Reston Hosp.
Ctr., 523 F. App'x 938, 946 (4th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (“Because a complaint guides the parties'
discovery, putting the defendant on notice of the evidence it
needs to adduce in order to defend against the
plaintiff's allegations, constructive amendment of the
complaint at summary judgment undermines the complaint's
purpose and can thus unfairly prejudice the defendant.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 336 (4th Cir.
2009) (“[A] plaintiff may not raise new claims after
discovery has begun without amending his complaint.”).
the § 1983 theories of liability that Plaintiff has
actually alleged, the Court agrees with the Library Board
that Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to hold the Board liable under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978), for any alleged constitutional violations.
See Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir.
2003) (reciting the four ways in which plaintiffs may
establish § 1983 liability under Monell). In
other words, while the Court sees no clear error in the
Magistrate Judge's analysis as to whether Plaintiff has
shown a triable issue on any alleged constitutional