United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division
Bryan Harwell United States District Judge.
Olandio Ray Workman, a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro
se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the four above-captioned Defendants. The matter is
before the Court for a ruling on Plaintiff's objections
to the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of
United States Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald, who
recommends summarily dismissing this action.
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.
The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive
weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination
remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review
of those portions of the R & R to which specific
objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the
Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been
filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de
novo review when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a
specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v.
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews
only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the
Court need not give any explanation for adopting the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
complaint, Plaintiff names four defendants: Metro PCS Mobile
Phone Company, Metro PCS, Metro PCS Mobile, and Mr.
Richardson. See Complaint [ECF No. 1]. He alleges
his Fourth Amendment (and other) rights were violated when
“Metro PCS acted under color of state or local law. . .
[and] aid[ed] Greenville County Sheriffs and trace[d] our
cell phone without [a] warrant and told them my
family['s] location.” Id. at 4. The
Magistrate Judge recommends summarily dismissing this action
without prejudice. See R & R [ECF No. 9].
Plaintiff has filed objections to the R & R. See
Pl.'s Objs. [ECF No. 11].
the Court notes Plaintiff does not specifically object to the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Court should
dismiss the three Metro PCS defendants because they are not
persons as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See R
& R at 2-3. Finding no clear error, the Court adopts this
recommendation and will dismiss these three defendants from
this action. See Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315;
Camby, 718 F.2d at 199-200.
Plaintiff appears to object to the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation that the Court should dismiss the remaining
defendant-Mr. Richardson-because Plaintiff's complaint
does not plead any factual allegations against Mr.
Richardson. See R & R at 3-4. Plaintiff makes
the following statement in his objections:
Mr. Richardson due to your administrative misconduct you
neglected to train your supervising management and employees
to obay the constitutional rights of your customers due to
Metro PCS violating of our 4th Amendment right by
unlawfully traceing our cell phone to our home without a
search warrant for Greenville County Police[.] We do say that
you Mr. Richardson deliberately indifferent to break our
4th Amendment right!
Pl.'s Objs. at 1. Having considered Plaintiff's
statement, the Court could liberally construe it as a motion
to amend his complaint to add the above factual allegations
against Mr. Richardson. See generally Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (stating “[a]
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed”
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976))). However, the Court finds such amendment would be
futile. See Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car
Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating leave to amend should be denied if amendment would
Mr. Richardson is not a state actor amenable to suit under
§ 1983-according to Plaintiff's complaint, Mr.
Richardson is the “registered agent” for Metro
PCS Mobile. ECF No. 1 at 2-3; see Loftus v.
Bobzien, 848 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2017) (“To
state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); DeBauche v. Trani, 191
F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]o become state
action, private action must have a sufficiently close nexus
with the state that the private action may be fairly treated
as that of the State itself.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Second, even when liberally construed,
Plaintiff's allegations do not indicate Mr. Richardson
committed the alleged deprivation by his own individual
actions. See Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 439 n.7 (4th
Cir. 2015) (noting “principles of respondeat superior
do not apply in imposing liability under § 1983”
and explaining the defendant's “own individual
actions must violate the [plaintiff's] rights”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g.,
id. (finding the mere fact that the defendant
“had general supervisory authority over [his]
employees” was insufficient to impose § 1983
liability). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff's
proposed amendment is futile and will overrule
Plaintiff's objections; and to the extent his objections
could be considered a request to amend, it is denied as
Court has thoroughly reviewed the entire record, including
Plaintiff's complaint, the R & R, and Plaintiff's
objections. For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules
Plaintiff's objections, adopts and incorporates the R
& R [ECF No. 9] by reference, and DISMISSES ...