United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Florence Division
BRYAN HARWELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Arnold Parson, Jr., proceeding pro se, filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the above-captioned
Defendants. The matter is before the Court for resolution of
Plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation
(“R & R”) of United States Magistrate Judge
Kaymani D. West, made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of
South Carolina. See R & R [ECF No. 29];
Pl.'s Objs. [ECF No. 34].
Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court.
The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive
weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination
remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review
of those portions of the R & R to which specific
objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the
Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been
filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de
novo review when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a
specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v.
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews
only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the
Court need not give any explanation for adopting the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court summarily dismiss
Defendants Collins, Smith, Atkinson, Foxworth, Shaw, Floyd,
Troy, and Harper without prejudice because Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint contains no substantive allegations
of wrongdoing by these defendants. R & R at 2-5;
see ECF No. 24 [complaint]. Plaintiff objects only
to the dismissal of Defendant Harper, arguing Harper must be
a named party in order for service to be perfected on
Defendant Marion County (on which service has been
authorized). Pl.'s Objs. at 1-2. Plaintiff indicates
Harper is the Chief Administrative Officer of Marion County.
Id. Plaintiff also states he “reserves the
right to adjoin and serve the Clerk Sabrina Davis as proper
party to receive service of process for the County of Marion
in accords with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(6).” Id. at
Court readily disposes of Plaintiff's objections. As the
Magistrate Judge explains, county officials such as Defendant
Harper do not need to be “named as defendants in order
to effect service of process on Defendant Marion
County.” R & R at 3. In other words, Marion County
can be served without Harper (or Davis) being a named
defendant. Regardless, Plaintiff's arguments are moot
because the Magistrate Judge authorized service of process on
Marion County,  the Clerk issued a summons for Marion
County to be served by the U.S. Marshal, and Marion County
responded to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint by
filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See ECF Nos. 28, 31, & 36.
Thus, it is apparent that Defendant Marion County has been
Court has thoroughly reviewed the entire record, including
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, the R & R, and
Plaintiff's objections. For the foregoing reasons, the
Court overrules Plaintiff's objections, adopts and
incorporates the R & R [ECF No. 29] by reference, and
DISMISSES Defendants Collins, Smith, Atkinson, Foxworth,
Shaw, Floyd, Troy, and Harper without prejudice and
without issuance and service of process. The Court
recommits this case to the Magistrate Judge for further
 The Magistrate Judge reviewed
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pursuant to the
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A. The Court is mindful of its duty to liberally construe
the pleadings of pro se litigants. See Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). But see
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th
Cir. 1985) (“Principles requiring generous construction
of pro se complaints are not, however, without limits.
Gordon directs district courts to construe pro se