United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division
ORDER AND OPINION
Richard Mark Gergel United States District Court Judge.
This
matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to
dismiss, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the
complaint, and Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of
time to file a reply in support of its motion for leave to
amend. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies
without prejudice the motion to dismiss, grants the motion
for leave to amend without prejudice to a renewed motion to
dismiss, and denies as moot the motion for an extension.
Defendants may file a renewed motion to dismiss or a
responsive pleading by July 10, 2017.
I.
Background
Plaintiffs
Lowcountry Block and Lowcountry Paver (collectively,
“Lowcountry”) filed suit in the Jasper County
Court of Common Pleas on December 23, 2016, alleging
Defendant Cincinnati Insurance Company failed to pay a claim
arising from a theft on September 23, 2013, as required under
an insurance policy it issued to Lowcountry Block, and
asserting claims for breach of contract and bad faith denial
of insurance benefits. The complaint identifies Lowcountry
Paver as an additional Plaintiff and the Cincinnati Insurance
Group and the Cincinnati Insurance Companies as additional
Defendants, but those parties' relationship to the
dispute is unclear. The complaint was served on or about
April 8, 2017, and Cincinnati removed to this Court on May 3,
2017.
On May
10, 2017, Cincinnati moved to dismiss the complaint.
Cincinnati argues that the complaint is barred by a
three-year statute of limitations, which is also an express
contractual term of the insurance policy, and that the
complaint lacks sufficient allegations to state a plausible
claim for breach of an insurance contract or for bad faith
denial of insurance benefits. In addition to opposing
Cincinnati's motion, Lowcountry moved for leave to amend
the complaint on June 2, 2017-only two days after the period
in which Lowcountry could amend the complaint as a matter of
right. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). The proposed
amended complaint is over three times as lengthy as the
original complaint, and adds an additional Plaintiff, Thomas
Curry, and an additional cause of action under S.C. §
38-59-20. (See Dkt. No. 10-1.)
II.
Legal Standard
A.
Motion to Dismiss
Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the
dismissal of an action if the complaint fails “to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Such a
motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and
“does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the
merits of the claim, or the applicability of defenses. . . .
Our inquiry then is limited to whether the allegations
constitute ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'”
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,
952 (4th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is obligated to
“assume the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint
and the existence of any fact that can be proved, consistent
with the complaint's allegations.” E. Shore
Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d
175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). However, while the Court must
accept the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party, it “need not accept as true unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
Id.
To
survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although the
requirement of plausibility does not impose a probability
requirement at this stage, the complaint must show more than
a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A complaint has “facial plausibility”
where the pleading “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.
B.
Motion to Amend
Under
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, after
the time has passed to amend a pleading as a matter of
course, “a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party's written consent or the court's
leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Rule 15(a) is a “liberal rule [that]
gives effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving
cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on
technicalities.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d
404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). However, “[m]otions
to amend are committed to the discretion of the trial
court.” Keller v. Prince George's County,
923 F.2d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1991). Thus, “[a] district
court may deny a motion to amend when the amendment would be
prejudicial to the opposing party, the moving party has acted
in bad faith, or the amendment would be futile.”
Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d
597, 602-03 (4th Cir. 2010).
Futility
is apparent if the proposed amended complaint fails to state
a claim under the applicable rules and accompanying
standards: “[A] district court may deny leave if
amending the complaint would be futile-that is, if the
proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements
of the federal rules.” United States ex rel. Wilson
v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376
(4th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If
an amendment would fail to withstand a motion to dismiss, it
is futile.” Woods v. Boeing Co., 841 F.Supp.2d
925, 930 (D.S.C. 2012). “Therefore, if any new
well-pleaded facts are asserted in the new proposed
complaint, but they fail to show that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief, the court should deny the motion for
leave to amend.” In re. Bldg. Materials Corp. of
Am. Asphalt Roofing Shingle Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
8-11-2000-JMC, 2013 WL 12152414, at *2 (D.S.C. June 17,
2013).
III.
Discussion
Lowcountry's
current three-page complaint is obviously deficient. The
complaint was filed after the three year limitations period
lapsed on September 22, 2016. In opposition to the motion to
dismiss, Lowcountry argues the period should be tolled
because “the insurance company purposely refused to
properly administer the claim in an effort to attempt to
delay so that it could raise the statute of limitations
defense and avoid paying the claim at issue.” (Dkt. No.
7-1 at 3.)[1] Lowcountry attaches to its legal memoranda
affidavits and correspondence in support of that argument but
the complaint itself is devoid of any supporting factual
allegations. The complaint likewise is devoid of any factual
allegations supporting the asserted breach of contract or bad
faith claims. The complaint simply identifies ...