OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR
RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted April 1, 2017
From The Workers' Compensation Commission
Huff, Jr., and Shelby G. Hapeshis, both of Huff &
Hapeshis, LLC, of Irmo, for Appellants.
Woodrow Grady Jordan, of Smith, Jordan and Lavery, P.A., of
Easley, for Respondent.
Manufacturing Company (Alice Manufacturing) and Great
American Alliance Insurance Company (collectively,
Appellants) appeal the order of the Appellate Panel of the
Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel).
we find substantial evidence supports the Appellate
Panel's finding Martha Perez suffered a compensable
injury. See Hutson v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 399
S.C. 381, 386, 732 S.E.2d 500, 502 (2012) (noting the South
Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA) governs this
court's review of an appeal from the Appellate Panel);
Hall v. United Rentals, Inc., 371 S.C. 69, 79, 636
S.E.2d 876, 882 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Pursuant to the APA,
this court's review is limited to deciding whether the
Appellate Panel's decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence or is controlled by some error of law.");
Bentley v. Spartanburg Cty., 398 S.C. 418, 421-22,
730 S.E.2d 296, 298 (2012) ("Substantial evidence . . .
is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would
allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the
administrative agency reached."); Langdale v.
Carpets, 395 S.C. 194, 200, 717 S.E.2d 80, 83 (Ct. App.
2011) ("[T]he weight to be accorded evidence is reserved
to the Appellate Panel." (quoting Frame v. Resort
Servs. Inc., 357 S.C. 520, 528, 593 S.E.2d 491, 495 (Ct.
we find the Appellate Panel properly found Perez was entitled
to temporary total disability. See Lee v. Bondex,
Inc., 406 S.C. 97, 102, 749 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Ct. App.
2013) ("For temporary disability benefits, a claimant
must prove only that work restrictions prevent him from
performing the job he had before the injury, and that his
current employer has not offered him light-duty
we find the Appellate Panel's findings of contested facts
were properly made and sufficiently detailed to enable this
court to determine whether the evidence supported its
findings. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-40(A)
(2015) ("The award, together with a statement of the
findings of fact, rulings of law, and other matters pertinent
to the questions at issue, must be filed with the record of
the proceedings and a copy of the award must immediately be
sent to the parties in dispute."); Aristizabal v. I.
J. Woodside-Div. of Dan River, Inc., 268 S.C. 366,
370-71, 234 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1977) ("If a material fact is
contested, the [single c]ommissioner must make a specific,
express finding on it."); Canteen v. McLeod
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 400 S.C. 551, 558-59, 735 S.E.2d
246, 250 (Ct. App. 2012) ("The findings of fact made by
the Appellate Panel must be sufficiently detailed to enable
the reviewing court to determine whether the evidence
supports the findings."). We also find the Appellate
Panel did not err in the first challenged conclusion of law.
See Hall, 371 S.C. at 79, 636 S.E.2d at 882
("Pursuant to the APA, this court's review is
limited to deciding whether the Appellate Panel's
decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is
controlled by some error of law."); Bentley,
398 S.C. at 421-22, 730 S.E.2d at 298 ("Substantial
evidence . . . is evidence which, considering the record as a
whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion
the administrative agency reached."). Further, we need
not address Appellants' allegation of any error in the
remaining challenged conclusions of law because our
disposition as to previous issues is dispositive. See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate
court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the
disposition of a prior issue is dispositive); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 42-15-60(A) (2015) (requiring an employer of injured
employee to "provide medical, surgical, hospital, and
other treatment . . . as reasonably may be required");
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-10(A) (2015) ("When the
incapacity for work resulting from an injury is total, the
employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, as provided in this
chapter, to the injured employee during the total disability
a weekly compensation . . . .").
WILLIAMS and KONDUROS, JJ., and LEE, A. J, concur.