United States District Court, D. South Carolina
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge.
Sharod Addison (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional
rights during his incarceration at Kershaw Correctional
Institution (“KCI”) in the custody of the South
Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”).
Plaintiff sues SCDC and Danny Catoe (“Catoe”)
(collectively “Defendants”), asserting
constitutional and state law claims.
matter comes before the court on Defendants' motion for
summary judgment. [ECF No. 25]. Pursuant to Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court
advised Plaintiff of the dismissal and summary judgment
procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to
respond adequately to Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 26].
The motion having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 28, 29, 33],
it is ripe for disposition.
to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local
Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been
assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings.
Having carefully considered the record in this case, the
undersigned recommends the district judge grant
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
February 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Catoe
based on the same facts as this case. See Addison v.
Catoe, C/A No. 1:15-572-SB (“Addison
I”).Specifically, Plaintiff alleged in
Addison I that on August 23, 2013, Catoe was advised
that Plaintiff had thrown urine on Cpl. Moore
(“Moore”). Addison I, ECF No. 1 at 3.
Plaintiff alleged that Catoe claimed to have interviewed
Moore and Sgt. Lippe (“Lippe”) on August 28,
2013, and that Catoe transcribed the interviews on August 29,
2013. Id. According to Plaintiff, the transcripts
say that Moore and Lippe knew the liquid Plaintiff threw was
urine by the sight and the smell. Id. Catoe did not
personally interview Plaintiff, but he was interviewed by
another investigator. Id. On September 4, 2013,
Catoe obtained an arrest warrant for Plaintiff from the
Lancaster County magistrate for a charge of throwing bodily
fluids on a correctional employee. Id.
alleged that Moore testified at his disciplinary hearing on
September 10, 2013, and stated “that he wasn't
lookin[g] to smell urine,  he was very upset.”
Id. Plaintiff claimed that Lippe also testified at
his disciplinary hearing and stated that she was five feet
behind Moore and “by the time she got anywhere close to
smell anything all she could smell was mace.”
Id. at 4. Plaintiff claimed Catoe received a copy of
Lippe's incident report dated August 22, 2013, that
stated Lippe noticed Plaintiff throwing a liquid substance
onto Moore from a cup. Id. Addison I was summarily
dismissed because Plaintiff had not alleged that Catoe had
acted deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth,
and allegations of negligence are insufficient to provide a
basis for a constitutional violation. Id. at ECF
Nos. 10, 15.
lawsuit, Plaintiff makes many of the same allegations as in
Addison I, but alleges Catoe knowingly made false
statements. [ECF No. 1-1 at 2]. He alleges that Catoe acted
with malice by writing false reports and by allowing another
investigator to interview Plaintiff. Id. He alleges
that Catoe was the prosecuting officer and unlawfully seized
Plaintiff by arresting him. Id.
Standard on Summary Judgment
court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial
burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate;
if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to
the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant
asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that
assertion either by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes
of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials;” or “showing . . . that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support
the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of
the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the
federal court is charged with liberally construing a
complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development
of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal
construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear
failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a
federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.